Reliable and timely detection of cyber attacks become indispensable to protect networks and systems. Internet control message protocol (ICMP) flood attacks are still one of the most challenging threats in both IPv4 and IPv6 networks. This paper proposed an approach based on Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) to detect ICMP-based Denial Of service (DOS) and Distributed Denial Of Service (DDOS) flooding attacks. This is motivated by the high capacity of KLD to quantitatively discriminate between two distributions. Here, the three-sigma rule is applied to the KLD distances for anomaly detection. We evaluated the effectiveness of this scheme by using the 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Datasets.
Anomaly detection in the Internet of Things (IoT) is imperative to improve its reliability and safety. Detecting denial of service (DOS) and distributed DOS (DDOS) is one of the critical security challenges facing network technologies. This paper presents an anomaly detection mechanism using the Kullback-Leibler distance (KLD) to detect DOS and DDOS flooding attacks, including transmission control protocol (TCP) SYN flood, UDP flood, and ICMP-based attacks. This mechanism integrates the desirable properties of KLD, the capacity to quantitatively discriminate between two distributions, with the sensitivity of an exponential smoothing scheme. The primary reason for exponentially smoothing KLD measurements (ES-KLD) is to aggregate all of the information from past and actual samples in the decision rule, making the detector sensitive to small anomalies. Furthermore, a nonparametric approach using kernel density estimation has been used to set a threshold for ES-KLD decision statistic to uncover the presence of attacks. Tests on three publicly available datasets show improved performances of the proposed mechanism in detecting cyber-attacks compared to other conventional monitoring procedures.
Presently, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are broadly adopted in remote monitoring large-scale production systems and modern power grids. However, SCADA systems are continuously exposed to various heterogeneous cyberattacks, making the detection task using the conventional intrusion detection systems (IDSs) very challenging. Furthermore, conventional security solutions, such as firewalls, and antivirus software, are not appropriate for fully protecting SCADA systems because they have distinct specifications. Thus, accurately detecting cyber-attacks in critical SCADA systems is undoubtedly indispensable to enhance their resilience, ensure safe operations, and avoid costly maintenance. The overarching goal of this paper is to detect malicious intrusions that already detoured traditional IDS and firewalls. In this paper, a stacked deep learning method is introduced to identify malicious attacks targeting SCADA systems. Specifically, we investigate the feasibility of a deep learning approach for intrusion detection in SCADA systems. Real data sets from two laboratory-scale SCADA systems, a two-line three-bus power transmission system and a gas pipeline are used to evaluate the proposed method’s performance. The results of this investigation show the satisfying detection performance of the proposed stacked deep learning approach. This study also showed that the proposed approach outperformed the standalone deep learning models and the state-of-the-art algorithms, including Nearest neighbor, Random forests, Naive Bayes, Adaboost, Support Vector Machine, and oneR. Besides detecting the malicious attacks, we also investigate the feature importance of the cyber-attacks detection process using the Random Forest procedure, which helps design more parsimonious models.
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