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Competitive environments in which individuals compete for mutually-exclusive outcomes require rational decision making in order to maximize gains but often result in poor quality heuristics. Reasons for the greater reliance on lose-shift relative to win-stay behaviour shown in previous studies were explored using the game of Rock, Paper, Scissors and by manipulating the value of winning and losing. Decision-making following a loss was characterized as relatively fast and relatively inflexible both in terms of the failure to modulate the magnitude of lose-shift strategy and the lack of significant neural modulation. In contrast, decision-making following a win was characterized as relatively slow and relatively flexible both in terms of a behavioural increase in the magnitude of win-stay strategy and a neural modulation of feedback-related negativity (FRN) and stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN) following outcome value modulation. The win-stay/lose-shift heuristic appears not to be a unified mechanism, with the former relying on System 2 processes and the latter relying on System 1 processes. Our ability to play rationally appears more likely when the outcome is positive and when the value of wins are low, highlighting how vulnerable we can be when trying to succeed during competition.

No abstract

Rock, Paper, Scissors (RPS) represents a unique gaming space in which the predictions of human rational decision-making can be compared with actual performance. Playing a computerized opponent adopting a mixed-strategy equilibrium, participants revealed a non-significant tendency to over-select Rock. Further violations of rational decision-making were observed using an inter-trial analysis where participants were more likely to switch their item selection at trial n + 1 following a loss or draw at trial n, revealing the strategic vulnerability of individuals following the experience of negative rather than positive outcome. Unique switch strategies related to each of these trial n outcomes were also identified: after losing participants were more likely to ‘downgrade’ their item (e.g., Rock followed by Scissors) but after drawing participants were more likely to ‘upgrade’ their item (e.g., Rock followed by Paper). Further repetition analysis revealed that participants were more likely to continue their specific cyclic item change strategy into trial n + 2. The data reveal the strategic vulnerability of individuals following the experience of negative rather than positive outcome, the tensions between behavioural and cognitive influences on decision making, and underline the dangers of increased behavioural predictability in other recursive, non-cooperative environments such as economics and politics.

Over 5 experiments, we challenge the idea that the capacity of audio-visual integration need be fixed at 1 item. We observe that the conditions under which audio-visual integration is most likely to exceed 1 occur when stimulus change operates at a slow rather than fast rate of presentation and when the task is of intermediate difficulty such as when low levels of proactive interference (3 rather than 8 interfering visual presentations) are combined with the temporal unpredictability of the critical frame (Experiment 2), or, high levels of proactive interference are combined with the temporal predictability of the critical frame (Experiment 4). Neural data suggest that capacity might also be determined by the quality of perceptual information entering working memory. Experiment 5 supported the proposition that audio-visual integration was at play during the previous experiments. The data are consistent with the dynamic nature usually associated with cross-modal binding, and while audio-visual integration capacity likely cannot exceed uni-modal capacity estimates, performance may be better than being able to associate only one visual stimulus with one auditory stimulus.