Numerous studies suggest that preverbal infants possess the ability to make sociomoral judgements and demonstrate a preference for prosocial agents. Some theorists argue that infants possess an “innate moral core” that guides their sociomoral reasoning. However, we propose that infants’ capacity for putative sociomoral evaluation and reasoning can just as likely be driven by a domain-general associative-learning mechanism that is sensitive to agent action. We implement this theoretical account in a connectionist computational model and show that it can account for the pattern of results in Hamlin et al. (2007) and Hamlin and Wynn (2011). These are pioneering studies in this area and were among the first studies to examine sociomoral evaluation in preverbal infants. Based on the results of 6 computer simulations, we suggest that a domain-general associative-learning mechanism can account for previous findings on preverbal infants’ capacity for sociomoral evaluation. These results suggest that an innate moral core may not be necessary to account for apparent sociomoral evaluation in infants.

Causal reasoning is a fundamental cognitive ability that enables humans to learn about the complex interactions in the world around them. However, it remains unknown whether causal reasoning is underpinned by a Bayesian mechanism or an associative one. For example, some maintain that a Bayesian mechanism underpins human causal reasoning because it can better account for backward-blocking (BB) and indirect screening-off (IS) findings than certain associative models. However, the evidence is mixed about the extent to which learners engage in both kinds of reasoning. Here, we report an experiment and several computational models that examine to what extent adults engage in BB and IS reasoning using the blicket-detector design. The results revealed that adults’ causal ratings in a backwards-blocking and indirect screening-off condition were consistent with associative rather than a Bayesian computational model. These results are interpreted to mean that adults use associative processes to reason about causal events.

The ability to reason about causal events in the world is fundamental to cognition. Despite the importance of this ability, little is known about how adults represent causal events, what structure or form those representations take, and what the mechanism is that underpins such representations. We report four experiments with adults that examine the perceptual basis on which adults represent four-object launching sequences (Experiments 1 and 2), whether adults representations reflect sensitivity to the causal, perceptual, or causal and perceptual relation among the objects that comprise such sequences (Experiment 3), and whether such representations extend beyond spatiotemporal contiguity to include other low-level stimulus features such as an object’s shape and color (Experiment 4). Based on these results of the four experiments, we argue that a domain-general associative mechanism, rather a modular, domain-specific, mechanism subserves adults’ representations of four-object launching sequences.