It is argued in this note that we can take instruction and give it because we instruct ourselves, with a self-rapport as the basic movement of our cognitive activity or thinking. Psychology does not, it is argued, have to explain human curiosity or human understanding; but it can talk about how to and how we deal with these things — that is, their conditions of operation — if it pays attention to the instructional facts. When attention is given to the interactive and social context of cognition, some educationists' criticisms of instructional psychology may be countered, and the psychology of cognition and its development will benefit from being more reality oriented. It is concluded that the empiricism of psychology is not a cold recording of behaviour, but rather a study of instructive plans for action, with both better plans and better action as the goal.

The intention of this speculative statement is to review and revise a position outlined some years ago in various forms. According to this view, instructive action (or teaching) is not a matter accidental to the scientific practice of psychology, but rather the essential concern, being the currency of the single message exchange system that constitutes human action. It is possible then to look at some of the relevant evidence that psychological science provides, and to suggest that possibilities for effective use in instructional practice may follow from seeing psychologists’ actions as instructive activity, not merely for their peers, who are the audience for their words, but in connection with their essential role in this larger context of the single message exchange system and thence to the subsystems of the larger context in which social schemes guide action. It is thought that the debate produced by the call for evidence-based practice in education may be helped by consideration of this view that would place instructive activity at the centre of things. Some problems are identified for psychologists and teachers and some general suggestions are made about seeking a dynamic balance of forces and connection of levels in an interactive scheme where the activities of each party might produce evidence bearing upon the plans for action of the other.

The general argument presented is that the doings of cognitive psychologists should be seen as a “cognitive practice” that is identical with teaching. Teaching, following Ryle, is also regarded as the best name for what people do to themselves when they think. The basic point is that to ask about it is to do it‐i.e. practise cognition (i.e. teach)‐and vice versa. This has implications for the debate on cognitive psychology being applied in education. It is claimed that most cognitive experiments are excellent demonstrations of the necessary art of how to get people to do things, and how to learn exactly what is being done when they are got to do them. The demand to be scientific is seen as a demand for clear instructive statements‐publicly available descriptions that are prescriptions. There is no quarrel with what cognitive experimenters are doing, save for their refusal to notice that it is in fact all a study of what you can teach people to do, and could not be anything else‐a refusal which wishes on us non‐problems of various kinds and obscures real issues in cognitive debate. Experimenters are seen as acting sensibly, but not looking at what they do, and getting their own data into the picture.

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