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How is it possible to deploy the law to create and perform accountability? To answer this question, I address the argumentative function of the law in order to legitimize genetic medicine. Using interview data, I will in particular elaborate on how medical experts strive to convince interviewing social scientists that their own professional action is above all ethical reproach. For this purpose, medical experts capitalize on the law in specific ways. It is the aim of this article to expound exactly how this happens during qualitative research interviews. The analysis of the interview data is informed by the works of Sheila Jasanoff and Michel Foucault. The former provides an instructive conceptual background for demonstrating how the law serves as an important element of accountability practices. The latter is known for his plea not to understand the law in repressive terms. Accordingly, the law does not prohibit specific medical practices, but in a specific sense it rather makes medical practice socially robust. Based on qualitative analysis of interview data, I conclude that referring to the law allows experts of genetic medicine to evade engaging with ethical and social aspects of their work. The law was rhetorically utilized to bring a discussion on such issues to a communicative closure. For that purpose, the existence of the law was presented as proof that undesirable practices would not be possible and consequently further discussions of the matter would be unnecessary. The law allows medical experts to transfer ethical problems to other places and actors and also to promote their professional interests.

Part of the current enthusiasm about open science stems from its promises to reform scientific practice in service of the common good, to ensure that scientific outputs will be found and reused more easily, and to enhance scientific impact on policy and society. With this article, we question this optimism by analysing the potential for open science practices to enhance research uptake at the science–policy interface. Science advice is critical to help policy-makers make informed decisions. Likewise, some interpretations of open science hold that making research processes and outputs more transparent and accessible will also enhance the uptake of results by policy and society at large. However, we argue that this hope is based on an unjustifiably simplistic understanding of the science–policy interface that leaves key terms (“impact”, “uptake”) undefined. We show that this understanding—based upon linear models of research uptake—likewise grounds the influential “evidence–policy gap” diagnosis which holds that to improve research uptake, communication and interaction between researchers and policy-makers need to be improved. The overall normative stance of both discussions has sidelined empirical description of the science–policy interface, ignoring questions about the underlying differences between the policy domain and academia. Importantly, both open science and literature on closing the evidence–policy gap recommend improving communication (in terms of either the content or the means) as a viable strategy. To correct some of these views, we combine insights from policy theory with a narrative review of the literature on the evidence–policy gap in the health domain and find that removing barriers to access by itself will not be enough to foster research uptake.

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