Relationships between measures of creativity and measures ofint'elligence were analysed to show that even when the intercorrelations among the former are not appreciably larger than correlations between creativity and intelligence measures, dimensions of creativity are found to be psychometrically and conceptually distinct from dimensions of intelligence.One hundred eighty-eight art and engineering college students were administered objective tests and questionnaires designed to tap a number of ability and nonability indicants of creativity and intelligence. Some of these measures were of a kind that some investigators would regard as "criterion" measures of creativity and intelligence. Data were analysed by means of correlational and factor analytic procedures. Eight major influences were indicated by independent factors rotated to approximate simple structure. The influences represented by these factors were identified as: fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, memory, fluency, rule-orientation versus intuitive thinking, and self-sufficient-calculated-risk-taking. The fourth, seventh, and eighth factors were discussed as representing distinct cognitive, motivational, and temperamental aspects of creativity. At the level of test intercorrelations discriminant validity did not obtain--measures of creativity did not intercorrelate more highly among themselves than they correlated with measures of intelligence. The putative factors of creativity did correlate more highly with creativity criteria, however, than did the factors identified as representing intelligence. Moreover, the intelligence factors were more highly related to intelligence criteria than to creativity criteria.Thus. the evidence of this study suggests that it is useful to think of creativity and intelligence as the outgrowths of distinct (although overlapping) sets of influences, even when this is not well indicated by discriminant-convergent validation analyses carried out with respect to tests (in contrast to factors).

The present study investigated two major hypotheses: Instances which confirm or disconfirm a generic assertion (e.g., "Bill hurts Antuvians") combine additively to yield the judged likelihood that the assertion is true; and the less expected a piece of credible information, the greater the impact of that piece of information on a person's likelihood judgment. The subjects were asked to decide how likely they thought it was that a man (described as either kind, cruel, or by no adjective) would perform a certain act (which was either evaluatively positive, neutral, or negative) after being given 0, 1, or 2 instances of confirming and/or discontinuing information. Within each Adjective X Act combination, the likelihood data were well described by an additive model. As expected, information was found to have greater impact when (a) the subject was given an instance of information which was inconsistent with other instances presented in an item; (ft) the subject was given a discontinuing instance of a positively evaluated assertion or a confirming instance of a negatively evaluated assertion; and (c) the subject was given a disconfirming instance of a balanced situation or a confirming instance of an imbalanced situation.

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