Bundling, which is the practice of selling two or more products or services in a package, is a pervasive marketing practice and is often used as a strategic competitive tool. However, there has not been enough consideration of competitive bundling situations in which exit of a competitor is not a concern. In this paper, we address this issue by identifying conditions under which strategic competitors may or may not resort to bundling when competitor exit considerations are absent. We study competition between a multiproduct generalist firm and two single-product specialist firms in two product categories, one of which has undifferentiated products and the other has differentiated products. In our model, the specialist firms can form an alliance to bundle their products in competing with the generalist firm. In contrast to the previous literature, we find that concurrent bundling by competitors, if it occurs in equilibrium, is profitable. We also find that when one competitor bundles and the other does not, the bundling firm gains a greater share of customers and makes a higher profit. However, when conditions favor counterbundling by a competitor, such counterbundling helps the competitor retain its customers. Finally, we note that under other market conditions, concurrent bundling by competitors escalates price competition to the extent that retaining customers through bundling is not profitable. In such a case, we show that strategic competitors are better off having asymmetric product lines with one competitor bundling and the other selling unbundled.

S ocial sharing of information goods-wherein a single good is purchased and shared through a network of acquaintances such as friends or coworkers-is a significant concern for the providers of these goods. The effect of social sharing on firm pricing and profits depends critically on two elements: the structure of the underlying consumer network and the mechanism used by groups to decide whether to purchase at a given price. We examine the effect of social sharing under different network structures (decentralized, centralized, and complete), which reflect a range of market conditions. Moreover, we draw from the mechanism design literature to examine several approaches to group decision making. Our results suggest that a firm can benefit from increased social sharing if the level of sharing is already high, enabling a pricing strategy targeted primarily at sharing groups rather than individuals. However, the point at which sharing becomes marginally beneficial for a firm depends on both the distribution of group sizes (which derives from the network structure) and the group decision mechanism. Additional insights are obtained when we extend the model to capture homophily in group formation and the potential that a subset of consumers will never share for ethical reasons.

Many retailers offer refunds to consumers who, after a trial period, return a product that they find does not fit their needs. Some consumers are willing to use this return option opportunistically for short‐term consumption rather than its intended purpose of resolving fit uncertainty. Such behavior has been termed “wardrobing.” Restocking fees (partial refunds) can be used to combat wardrobing. However, there is a trade‐off involved, since partial refunds will be viewed negatively by consumers who return an item due to a true lack of fit. In this study, we consider how the extent of wardrobing (how many consumers consider such behavior) and the benefit of wardrobing (how much value can be extracted during the trial) impact firm pricing decisions and profits in this retail context. Our results imply that an increase in the extent of wardrobing is most detrimental to profits when the current extent of wardrobing is low. On the contrary, if the extent of wardrobing is already very high, and the benefit of wardrobing to consumers is also high, the retailer can set prices and refunds such that additional wardrobing actually increases firm profits. In a model extension, we show how a retailer can effectively screen wardrobers from ordinary consumers by offering a menu of price/refund pairs, and that such an approach can lead to increased profits if the extent of wardrobing is sufficiently high. Overall, our findings provide new insights into how retailers can set prices and refund policies to effectively manage opportunistic behavior by consumers.

Sustainability, a broad concept that includes numerous environmental and social dimensions, has emerged as an important product evaluation criterion for consumers. We suggest the impact of sustainability on consumer behavior depends on two factorseach individual consumer's unique level of concern about sustainability, and the general level of awareness regarding the sustainability of competing products-that together determine the level of heterogeneity among consumer attitudes toward sustainability. We incorporate sustainability concern and awareness into a model of horizontal competition in a duopoly, where one firm's product is more sustainable than the other's. Our results suggest that marginal increases in awareness can benefit all firms, including the less sustainable one, when awareness is sufficiently high (the explicit goal of recent sustainability labeling initiatives). In several model extensions, we provide additional insights for the following cases: the sustainable firm controls the extent of its sustainability advantage, the sustainable firm can directly influence the general level of awareness, and the distribution of sustainability concern across consumers is nonuniform. Our results enable us to suggest several new insights for managers, both those whose products enjoy a sustainability advantage and those whose products do not.

Price promotions and bundling have been two of the most widely used marketing tools in industry practice. Past literature has assumed that firms respond to price promotions by promoting a product in the same category. In this paper, we extend this literature as well as the bundling literature by considering the possibility that a firm may respond to a competitor's price promotions by also offering a cross-buying or bundling discount. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that bundle discounts can help increase profits in a competitive market by creating endogenous loyalty, thereby reducing the intensity of promotional competition. We also find that bundle discounts can be used as an effective defensive marketing tool to prevent customer defection to the competition.bundling, competitive marketing strategy, game theory, price promotions, brand loyalty