Public health events have done great harm. Emergency management requires the joint participation of multiple parties including government department, pharmaceutical enterprises, citizens and new media. Then, what are the effects of different strategy choices in participation of citizens and new media on emergency management? To answer the question, we construct a four-party evolutionary game model, considering the citizens' two participation ways consisted of true evaluation and false evaluation, and the new media's two participation ways consisted of report after verification and report without verification. This is of more practical significance than simply studying whether citizens and new media participate in emergency management or not because citizen and new media participation does not represent the completely positive behavior. Then, we conduct the evolutionary stability analysis, solve the stable equilibrium points using the Lyapunov first method and conduct the simulation analysis with MATLAB 2020b . The results show that, firstly, the greater the probability of citizens making true evaluation, the more inclined the government department is to strictly implement the emergency management system; secondly, when the probability of citizens making true evaluation decreases, new media are more inclined to report after verification, and when new media lose more pageview value or should be punished more for reporting without verification, the probability that they report without verification is smaller; thirdly, the greater the probability of citizens making false evaluation, the less enthusiasm of pharmaceutical enterprises to participate in emergency management, which indicates that false evaluation is detrimental to prompt pharmaceutical enterprises to participate; what's more, the greater the probability of new media reporting after verification, the greater the probability of pharmaceutical enterprises actively participating, which shows that new media's verification to citizens' evaluation is beneficial to emergency management.

His research interests are product quality management in supply chain. Science Fund of China under grant No.20BGL272.

The outbreak of COVID-19 has once again made people realize the great danger of public health events. To cope with public health events, the central governments in many countries have established emergency management systems and took many measures including non-pharmaceutical interventions, but the implementation efforts of local governments varied. And, the extent to which local governments implement emergency management measures affects the effectiveness of those measures. That indicates that the supervision and regulation to local government are needed in emergency management. As the participants of emergency management, many agents like central government, citizens, and new media all can be regulators or the subjects of supervision. So, how can these agents be prompted to make strategy choices in favor of emergency management supervision in public health events? To answer the question, we construct a game model with multi-participation. Pure strategy Nash equilibrium, dominant strategy equilibrium and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium are solved and analyzed. Besides, we conduct simulation analysis with Matlab 2020b to further analyze the model. The paper enriches the theoretical basis of emergency management in public health events, and provides suggestions for the supervision.

Public health events endanger the citizen health, economic development, social stability and national security seriously. Emergency management requires the joint participation of multiple parties. Therefore, we construct an evolutionary game model involving government department, pharmaceutical enterprises, citizens and new media, analyze the evolutionary stability, solve the stable equilibrium points using the Lyapunov first method and conduct the simulation analysis with Matlab 2020b. The results show that, firstly, the greater the probability of citizens making true evaluation, the more inclined the government department is to strictly implement the emergency management system, and when true evaluation causes the government department to bear more punishment, the probability that the government department doesn't strictly implement is smaller; secondly, when the probability of citizens making true evaluation decreases, new media are more inclined to report after verification, and when new media lose more pageview value or should be punished more for reporting without verification, the probability that they report without verification is smaller; thirdly, the greater the probability of citizens making false evaluation, the less enthusiasm of pharmaceutical enterprises to participate in emergency management, which indicates that false evaluation is detrimental to prompt pharmaceutical enterprises to participate; what's more, the greater the probability of new media reporting after verification, the greater the probability of pharmaceutical enterprises actively participating, which shows that new media's verification to citizens' evaluation is beneficial to emergency management. So, this paper provides suggestions for the emergency management and supervision.