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The MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change is an organization for research, independent policy analysis, and public education in global environmental change. It seeks to provide leadership in understanding scientific, economic, and ecological aspects of this difficult issue, and combining them into policy assessments that serve the needs of ongoing national and international discussions. To this end, the Program brings together an interdisciplinary group from two established research centers at MIT: the Center for Global Change Science (CGCS) and the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR). These two centers bridge many key areas of the needed intellectual work, and additional essential areas are covered by other MIT departments, by collaboration with the Ecosystems Center of the Marine Biology Laboratory (MBL) at Woods Hole, and by short-and long-term visitors to the Program. The Program involves sponsorship and active participation by industry, government, and non-profit organizations.To inform processes of policy development and implementation, climate change research needs to focus on improving the prediction of those variables that are most relevant to economic, social, and environmental effects. In turn, the greenhouse gas and atmospheric aerosol assumptions underlying climate analysis need to be related to the economic, technological, and political forces that drive emissions, and to the results of international agreements and mitigation. Further, assessments of possible societal and ecosystem impacts, and analysis of mitigation strategies, need to be based on realistic evaluation of the uncertainties of climate science.This report is one of a series intended to communicate research results and improve public understanding of climate issues, thereby contributing to informed debate about the climate issue, the uncertainties, and the economic and social implications of policy alternatives. Titles in the Report Series to date are listed on the inside back cover. Market Power in International Carbon Emissions Trading: A Laboratory TestBjörn Carlén † AbstractThe prospect that governments of one or a few large countries, or trading blocs, would engage in international greenhouse gas emissions trading has led several policy analysts to express concerns that trade would be influenced by market power. The experiment reported here mimics a case where twelve countries, one of which is a large buyer (the mirror-image of a large seller), trade carbon emissions on an emissions exchange (a double-auction market) and where traders have quite accurate information about the underlying net demand. The findings deviate from those of the standard version of market power effects in that trade volumes and prices converge on competitive levels.

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To reach the Paris agreement targetkeeping global warming well below two degrees Celsius there is a need for emission reductions on top of those already pledged. Norway has an ambitious climate policy targeting demand, while on the supply side exports of oil and gas contribute significantly to global emissions. This paper reviews the literature to assess whether a reduction in Norwegian oil extraction constitutes a cost-efficient policy to reduce global emissions. Key factors are the costs of reducing domestic supply and demand, the effect of domestic reductions on global emissions and the effect on the technological development.

We analyse the extent to which the climate effect of unilateral climate policy in Nordic frontrunner countries may be nulli ied by the mechanics of the European Emission Trading System (ETS) in light of the recent tightening of the system. We ind that national initiatives to reduce emissions from the domestic ETS sector are likely to reduce total EU-wide emissions due to the endogeneity of the cap on ETS emission allowances. We also examine the cost-effective design of the unilateral climate policy of an EU frontrunner country, given the design of EU climate policy.Finally, we show that if the policy goal is to maximise national welfare, a uniform domestic carbon price across sectors is only optimal under special circumstances, and we highlight the importance of trade in emission rights and carbon leakage for optimal policy design.