As experiences of implementation of climate change adaptation are accumulating, there is a need to increase the understanding of negative effects that might occur and the capacity to assess them. Maladaptation in this context has remained elusively defined and sparingly used, and therefore difficult to apply. Based on a literature review, we identify the conceptual boundaries of maladaptation, assess how it can be used to analyse negative effects of adaptation policies and measures and propose a typology of maladaptation. We argue that maladaptation can be defined as a result of an intentional adaptation policy or measure leading to negative outcome(s) for the targeted or other actors. We note that the recognition of adaptation as an intentional action and the importance of setting clear spatial and temporal boundaries in analysing negative outcomes is key. The proposed typology of maladaptation distinguishes between three types of maladaptive outcomes-rebounding vulnerability, shifting vulnerability and eroding sustainable development.

Together now!' was the slogan used in the invitation to the Marrakesh Partnership for Global Climate Action (GCA), an initiative launched on the second day of the 22nd Conference of the Parties (COP 22) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Marrakesh in November 2016. During this event, the two high-level champions nominated by COP as an outcome of the Paris Agreementthe French Ambassador in charge of climate negotiations Laurence Tubiana and the Moroccan Minister of Environment Hakima El Haitécalled upon businesses, regions, cities, industries and NGOs to showcase their climate activities and partner with states in the transition to the low carbon society. The champions' effort to mobilize non-state climate action pre-2020 coincides with the launch during the last week of COP 22 of the 2050 Pathway Platform. Informed by the same cooperative spirit, this multi-stakeholder initiative rests upon a broad coalition among 15 cities, 22 states and 200 companies seeking to devise long-term, net zero, climate-resilient and sustainable development pathways. 1 These efforts to accelerate climate action by facilitating dialogue, knowledge exchange and cooperation among state and non-state actors intensify a trend in global climate politics: rapprochement of the realms of multilateral diplomacy and transnational climate action with the rationale to enhance the pre-2020 ambition. Officially, this process was set in motion during the 'Action Day' of COP 20 in Lima in 2014, when the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) and the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) were launched to 'galvanize the groundswell of actions on climate change mitigation and adaptation from cities, regions, businesses and civil society organizations' (Chan et al. 2015, p. 467). However, in practice, this "widened frame" for climate diplomacy' (Christoff 2016, p. 770) has a much longer history and reflects the growth and impact of transnational private actors, NGOs, social movement and transnational advocacy networks in world politics (Hoffmann 2011). Ever since the UNFCCC was signed at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, it has formed a veritable center of gravity for a multiplicity

In this article, we outline the multifaceted roles played by non-state actors within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and place this within the wider landscape of global climate governance. In doing so, we look at both the formation and aftermath of the 2015 Paris Agreement. We argue that the Paris Agreement cements an architecture of hybrid multilateralism that enables and constrains non-state actor participation in global climate governance. We flesh out the constitutive features of hybrid multilateralism, enumerate the multiple positions non-state actors may employ under these conditions, and contend that non-state actors will play an increasingly important role in the post-Paris era. To substantiate these claims, we assess these shifts and ask how non-state actors may affect the legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness of the Paris Agreement. © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. How to cite this article:WIREs Clim Change 2018, 9:e497. doi: 10.1002/wcc.497 INTRODUCTIONT he Paris Agreement now stands at the center of efforts by the international community to address the threats associated with climatic change. Within this Agreement-built upon the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)-non-state actors will play an increasingly important role. The presence and prominence of non-state actors within the Paris Agreement mirrors a broader shift across the international climate governance landscape in which nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business groups, think tanks, trade unions, private governance arrangements, transnational networks, and substate authorities assume active roles in limiting the negative effects of global warming. 1,2 This conceptualization of non-state actors includes civil society, business, research groups, and substate authorities. We prefer this expansive definition as it fits alongside the definition of nonparty stakeholders employed by the UNFCCC (see also Ref 3).In this article, we focus on how the Paris Agreement further deepens and complicates the connections between multilateralism and non-state action. It does so by creating an architecture that we call 'hybrid multilateralism' that splices together state and nonstate actors (on the usage of this term, see traits: state-led action defined and stipulated by the parties through their own nationally determined contributions (NDCs) as well as efforts by the UNFCCC to orchestrate transnational climate efforts. In both instances, non-state actors are formally and informally woven into the Paris Agreement performing a range of different and increasingly important functions. Non-state actors will act as watchdogs of the NDCs enhancing transparency, facilitating the stocktakes, and pressuring for the ratcheting up of NDCs every 5 years. Likewise non-state actors will act as contributors and governing partners through orchestration as they are encouraged by the Agreement 'to scale up their climate actions, and [register] those actions in the Non-State A...

There is widespread consensus that effective leadership will be required in order to successfully address the climate change challenge. Presently there are a number of self-proclaimed climate change leaders, but leadership is a relationship between leaders and followers. An actor aspiring to be a leader needs to be recognized as such. Despite its fundamental importance for leadership relationships, the demand side of the leadership equation has been comparatively neglected by past research. In this study we are looking for leaders by analyzing the perceptions of climate change leadership among UNFCCC COP-14 participants. Our results show that the climate change leadership mantle will have to be worn by more than one actor. Among the leadership candidates the EU was most widely recognized as a leader, however, only a small minority reported that they saw the EU as the only leader. The data also show that the US and the G77 thus far have failed to impress potential followers and it was China that clearly emerged as the second strongest leadership candidate.