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This paper discusses new institutional rules for a stable and lasting European Monetary Union (EMU). We propose a return to a strict and sustainable economic governance framework, which is mainly driven by market forces within a smart rule-based environment. Our recommendations are: (a) ex ante conditionalities with a tough monitoring process to avoid moral hazard in the future; (b) further enhancement of the Stability and Growth Pact; and (c) ultimo ratio punishment to be able to respond to the unique constellation of fiscal-monetary interaction and new rescue facilities. Countries violating fiscal rules for more than four years in a row will thus lose their fiscal sovereignty or will have to resign from the Eurozone. After fulfilling the ex ante conditionalities as well as all required criteria, the country either will recover its fiscal sovereignty, or, in case of exclusion, will be given the option to rejoin EMU under certain conditions. JEL codes: F33, F34, F36, H63, H81.

Usually financial crises go along with bubbles in asset prices, such as the housing bubble in the US in 2007. This paper attempts to build a mathematical model of financial bubbles from an econophysics, and thus a new perspective. I find that agents identify bubbles only with a time delay. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the detection of bubbles is different on either the individual or collective point of view. Second, I utilize the findings for a new definition of asset bubbles in finance. Finally, I extend the model to the study of asset price dynamics with news. In conclusion, the model provides unique insights into the properties and developments of financial bubbles.

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Forum economy worldwide. The global economic downturn is a new burden for the still weak eurozone. In February and March 2020, the European Central Bank (ECB) boldly adopted monetary measures in line with the 'whatever-it-takes' paradigm. At the moment, one is reminded of the phrase, "If the euro fails, then Europe fails" by German chancellor Angela Merkel. In terms of a unifi ed fi scal stimulus, economists and politicians have found the Holy Grail, too: eurobonds, also known as coronabonds, European Safe Bonds or a fi scal capacity (Blanchard et al., 2017; Brunnermaier, 2017; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018). Yet, this debate betrays a certain naivety as there is a lack of meticulous analysis of the conditions in the eurozone despite the need for Keynesian defi cit spending in a crisis.