The article systematically assesses the extent to which the Administration (Restrictions on Disposal etc. to Connected Persons) Regulations 2021 achieve the goal of the government to quell the negative perceptions of pre-pack administration. The pre-pack has generated much criticism from disenfranchised groups who regard the practice with much suspicion. These criticisms have triggered questions as to whether and how to structure the regulation of pre-packs. The article introduces original frames through which to distinguish the competing regulatory visions of the pre-pack, as well as to systematically evaluate the regulatory frameworks that have been introduced. The evaluation reveals a gap between the regulatory visions of the critics and the regulator. This gap has impacted the reception and effectiveness of successive regulatory frameworks. Combining its frames with the expectation gap theory, the article offers a critical assessment of the 2021 reforms, which address most but not all the criticisms of the pre-pack.

Rescue seeks to preserve the going concern in a financially distressed but potentially viable business. It aims, on one hand, to maximise the value in distressed businesses and, on the other, to give potentially viable but distressed businesses the opportunity of a second chance. In England and Wales, the main rescue process is structured to strive for the former but pays relatively little attention to the latter. The mechanisms that have been introduced to maximise the prospects of the achieving a going concern sale have been associated with the subsequent failure of the rescued business. It appears, therefore, that there is a discord between value maximisation and the survivability of rescued businesses. In 2015, the Graham Review sought to alleviate this discord by proposing the voluntary independent viability report and viability statement. While this article agrees with the reforms to the extent that they encourage due consideration for the future survival of rescued businesses, it argues that the requirements ought to be mandatory and that the buyer should be required to demonstrate that the amount of leverage carried forward and the time span for repayment are calculated with due consideration for the earning capacity of the rescued business and its own operational needs.

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Rescue seeks to preserve the going concern in a financially distressed but potentially viable business. It aims, on one hand, to maximise the value in distressed businesses and, on the other, to give potentially viable but distressed businesses the opportunity of a second chance. In England and Wales, the main rescue process is structured to strive for the former but pays relatively little attention to the latter. The mechanisms which have been introduced to maximise the prospects of the achieving a going-concern sale have been associated with the subsequent failure of the rescued business. It appears, therefore, that there is a discord between value maximisation and the survivability of rescued businesses. In 2015, the Graham review sought to alleviate this discord by proposing the voluntary independent viability report and viability statement. While this article agrees with the reforms to the extent that they encourage due consideration for the future survival of rescued businesses, it argues that the requirements ought to be mandatory. Further, that the buyer should be required to demonstrate that the amount of leverage carried forward and the time-span for repayment are calculated with due consideration for the earning capacity of the rescued business and its own operational needs. 2 An Invitation to Encourage Due Consideration for the Survivability of Rescued Businesses in the Business Rescue System of England and Wales Bolanle Adebola  Overview Business rescue connotes giving a financially distressed but potentially viable entity a second chance to succeed, by preserving the going-concern. On one hand, rescue aims to maximise the value in distressed businesses for the benefit of the pre-distress stakeholders; on the other, it seeks to give potentially viable but distressed businesses the opportunity of a second chance. It is not expected that the business is saved from outright failure merely to fail shortly afterwards-which will be referred to as recidivism. Recidivism erodes the economic and social benefits of going-concern preservation. Its costs are disproportionately borne by the subset of stakeholders who stand to lose the most from the failure of the business, to wit: it undermines the second chance granted to entrepreneurs and the benefits of the job preservation given to employees; 1 trade creditors not only receive little or nothing from the failure, they also lose a trading partner; the economy in general suffers the loss of a potentially valuable contributor. Ultimately, recidivism erodes trust in the rescue system. 2

Before the enactment of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990, receivership in Nigeria was governed by case law, informal rules (of practice) and the Companies Decree 1968. Nigerian judges were heavily influenced by British case law, precedents were British and the Nigerian Companies Decree was a transplant of the British Companies Act 1948. Against this background, the Supreme Court of Nigeria delivered the Intercontractors decisions in 1988, which subsequently governed the nature, status and powers of Nigerian receivers. In 1990, CAMA introduced a more robust receivership regime which prescribed the nature, status and powers of the receiver, reversing some of the Intercontractors principles. However, the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, failed to enforce the relevant provisions of CAMA or to examine the applicability of the Intercontractors principles that they conscientiously enforced. This article examines the validity of the Intercontractors principles and their continued relevance under CAMA 2004.