Decision makers increasingly recognise the importance of lifestyle changes in reaching low emission targets. How the mitigation potential of changes in mobility, dietary, housing or consumption behaviour compare to those of ambitious technological changes in terms of decarbonisation remains a key question. To evaluate the interplay of behaviour and technological changes, we make use of the European Calculator model and show that changes in behaviour may contribute more than 20% of the overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions required for net-zero by 2050. Behaviour and technology-oriented scenarios are tested individually and in combination for the EU plus the UK and Switzerland. The impacts of behavioural change vary across sectors, with significant GHG emission reduction potential and broader benefits. Changes in travel behaviour limit the rising demand for electricity, natural resources and infrastructure costs from the electrification of passenger transport. Adopting a healthy diet reduces emissions substantially compared to intensifying agricultural practices, while at the same time making cropland available for conservation or bioenergy crops. The trade-offs between energy and food may be substantially alleviated when deploying technological and behavioural changes simultaneously. The results suggest that without behavioural change, the dependency of Europe on carbon removal technologies for its net-zero ambitions increases. Structural changes will be necessary to achieve full decarbonisation by 2050, yet changes in lifestyles are crucial, contributing to achieving climate targets sooner.

Why do individuals take different decisions when confronted with similar choices? This paper investigates whether the answer lies in an evolutionary process. Our analysis builds on recent work in evolutionary game theory showing the superiority of a given type of preferences, homo moralis, in fitness games with assortative matching. We adapt the classical definition of evolutionary stability to the case where individuals with distinct preferences coexist in a population. This approach allows us to establish the characteristics of an evolutionarily stable population. Then, introducing an assortment matrix for assortatively matched interactions, we prove the existence of a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population in 2 × 2 symmetric fitness games under constant assortment, and we identify the conditions for its existence. Conversely to the classical setting, we find that the favored preferences in a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population are context-dependent. As an illustration, we discuss when and how an evolutionarily stable population made of both selfish and moral individuals exists in a prisoner's dilemma. These findings offer a theoretical foundation for the empirically observed diversity of preferences among individuals.

Why do individuals take different decisions when confronted with similar choices? This paper investigates whether the answer lies in an evolutionary process. Our analysis builds on recent work in evolutionary game theory showing the superiority of a given type of preferences, homo moralis, in fitness games with assortative matching. We adapt the classical definition of evolutionary stability to the case where individuals with distinct preferences coexist in a population. This approach allows us to establish the characteristics of an evolutionarily stable population. Then, introducing an assortment matrix for assortatively matched interactions, we prove the existence of a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population in 2×2 symmetric fitness games under constant assortment, and we identify the conditions for its existence. Conversely to the classical setting, we find that the favored preferences in a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population are context-dependent. As an illustration, we discuss when and how an evolutionarily stable population made of both selfish and moral individuals exists in a prisoner’s dilemma. These findings offer a theoretical foundation for the empirically observed diversity of preferences among individuals.

Understanding the economic magnitude of climate change (CC) impacts is a prerequisite for developing adequate adaptation strategies. In Switzerland, despite new climate scenarios and impact studies, only few impacts have been monetized. Our objective is to assess costs and opportunities of CC for Switzerland by 2060, while enhancing the assessment methods. Using inputs from bottom-up impact studies, we simulate the economic consequences of climate scenarios in a computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework. We cover health, buildings/infrastructure, energy, water, agriculture, tourism, the spill-overs to other sectors, and international effects. Due to data constraints, significant impacts have not been quantified, e.g., for heat waves and droughts more extreme than the 2060 average climate. For the considered impacts, welfare decreases by 0.37% to 1.37% in 2060 relative to a reference without CC. Higher summer temperatures increase mortality and decrease productivity. Contrariwise, tourism benefits from extended summer seasons. Regarding energy, increased demand for cooling is overcompensated by savings in heating.

Some individuals voluntarily engage in costly pro-environmental actions although their efforts have limited direct benefits. This paper proposes a novel economic model with heterogeneous agents explaining why. Each agent has a homo moralis type of preference, which combines selfishness and morality. Morality is modeled here as the payoff an agent receives if all other agents act like her. Our model builds on extant literature showing that homo moralis preferences have an evolutionary advantage to better evaluate the behavioral motives of agents. Shedding light on how people respond not only to economic but also moral incentives, we contribute to the ongoing policy debate on the design of efficient environmental policies.