This chapter provides a methodological case for maintaining classical logic even in the face of the semantic paradoxes. It advocates an abductive methodology for choosing, or adjudicating, logics (or, more specifically, logical theories), and notes that the semantic paradoxes constitute promising grounds for an abductive critique of classical logic. As the chapter notes, there is a strong prima facie abductive case for classical logic. This is not due to a principle of conservativism. It does not appeal to the benefits of familiarity with classical logic or the costs of changing the logic. It concerns, rather, intrinsic features of classical logic, such as its simplicity and strength. The chapter concludes that classical logic is doing fine by ordinary criteria and has no need for further justification, so we should keep it.

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In this article, I provide a general account of deflationism. After doing so, I turn to truth‐deflationism, where, after first describing some of the species, I highlight some challenges for those who wish to adopt it.

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