IMPORTANCE Policy makers have implemented beverage taxes to generate revenue and reduce consumption of sweetened drinks. In January 2017, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, became the second US city to implement a beverage excise tax (1.5 cents per ounce). OBJECTIVES To compare changes in beverage prices and sales following the implementation of the tax in Philadelphia compared with Baltimore, Maryland (a control city without a tax) and to assess potential cross-border shopping to avoid the tax in neighboring zip codes. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This study used a difference-indifferences approach and analyzed sales data to compare changes between January 1, 2016, before the tax, and December 31, 2017, after the tax. Differences by store type, beverage sweetener status, and beverage size were examined. The commercial retailer sales data included large chain store sales in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and the Pennsylvania zip codes bordering Philadelphia. These data reflect approximately 25% of the ounces of taxed beverages sold in Philadelphia. EXPOSURES Philadelphia's tax on sugar-sweetened and artificially sweetened beverages. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Change in taxed beverage prices and volume sales.

Objectives. We examined the effect of an intervention to provide caloric information about sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) on the number of SSB purchases. Methods. We used a case-crossover design with 4 corner stores located in low-income, predominately Black neighborhoods in Baltimore, Maryland. The intervention randomly posted 1 of 3 signs with the following caloric information: (1) absolute caloric count, (2) percentage of total recommended daily intake, and (3) physical activity equivalent. We collected data for 1600 beverage sales by Black adolescents, aged 12–18 years, including 400 during a baseline period and 400 for each of the 3 caloric condition interventions. Results. Providing Black adolescents with any caloric information significantly reduced the odds of SSB purchases relative to the baseline (odds ratio [OR] = 0.56; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.36, 0.89). When examining the 3 caloric conditions separately, the significant effect was observed when caloric information was provided as a physical activity equivalent (OR = 0.51; 95% CI = 0.31, 0.85). Conclusions. Providing easily understandable caloric information—particularly a physical activity equivalent—may reduce calorie intake from SSBs among low-income, Black adolescents.

Providing caloric information was associated with purchasing a smaller SSB, switching to a beverage with no calories, or opting to not purchase a beverage; there was a persistent effect on reducing SSB purchases after signs were removed.

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The US health insurance industry is highly concentrated, and health insurance premiums are high and rising rapidly. Policymakers have focused on the possible link between the two, leading to ACA provisions to increase insurer competition. However, while market power may enable insurers to include higher profit margins in their premiums, it may also result in stronger bargaining leverage with hospitals to negotiate lower payment rates to partially offset these higher premiums. We empirically examine the relationship between employer-sponsored fully-insured health insurance premiums and the level of concentration in local insurer and hospital markets using the nationally-representative 2006-2011 KFF/HRET Employer Health Benefits Survey. We exploit a unique feature of employer-sponsored insurance, in which self-insured employers purchase only administrative services from managed care organizations, to disentangle these different effects on insurer concentration by constructing one concentration measure representing fully-insured plans' transactions with employers and the other concentration measure representing insurers' bargaining with hospitals. As expected, we find that premiums are indeed higher for plans sold in markets with higher levels of concentration relevant to insurer transactions with employers, lower for plans in markets with higher levels of insurer concentration relevant to insurer bargaining with hospitals, and higher for plans in markets with higher levels of hospital market concentration.