This article addresses a significant gap in trauma theory and philosophy; namely, it develops a partial theory of the subject of intergenerational trauma. This is accomplished through a close examination of Catherine Malabou's theory of the subject of trauma, as well as by contact with the research in epigenetics of Rachel Yehuda, and the research on intergenerational trauma among First Nations people in Canada conducted by Amy Bombay and colleagues. It presents original work that is responsive to recent advances in a variety of fields, including philosophy, psychology, social science, and biology.

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comme chez Hannah Arendt, de travaux de longue haleine. Le thème, repris à son ami Gershom Scholem, relatif à «l'antisémitisme métaphysique» (p. 366) de la gnose antique, construit en réaction au judaïsme qui était alors la religion dominante, ne manquera pas d'éclairer avec force acuité le lecteur intéressé par ces questions. has been a widely infl uential philosopher of human agency for well over two decades now. Having already made signifi cant contributions to our understanding of intentionality and the temporally extended nature of our agency, his latest book, Shared Agency , extends the scope of his previous work to include a treatment of what he refers to as 'modest sociality' or 'shared agency.'Bratman's project in this book is to construct a conceptually, metaphysically, and normatively conservative model of shared agency that draws upon the resources provided by his earlier planning model of the temporally extended nature of our individual human agency. Throughout the book he maintains that there is a clear continuity between the components of how we intend and act as individuals and the conditions by which members of relatively small social groups exercise shared agency. This is not to say that what constitutes our individual planning agency is entirely suffi cient to explain modest sociality, but rather, that those natural elements that structure our individual planfulness may be seen to be both consistent with the basic elements of shared agency, and to play an important role in establishing an understanding of a type of shared agency that does not require any additional resources of a radically new kind. He sees this distinctive approach as providing something of a middle way between an insufficiently nuanced game theoretic view of shared agency that describes the phenomenon as nothing more than strategic equilibrium by two or more agents acting in proximity and in response to one another, and a kind of over-burdened view of acting together that includes entitlements and so saddles agents with obligations. While Bratman is careful not to spend too much time on the over-simple game theoretic view of shared agency, he does in several places contrast his modest view of sociality with what he takes to be the overly extravagant proposals advanced by John Searle and Margaret Gilbert. The views of both Searle and Gilbert, according to Bratman, remain less appealing than the conservative model he proposes since they each posit different new basic practical elements to explain shared agencyfor Searle, these are irreducible 'we-intentions,' and for Gilbert, it is an irreducible 'joint commitment.' While Bratman maintains that Searlean we-intentions are better explained in terms of his conservative planning account of shared agency, he also argues that his model can accommodate things like the commitments and obligations