In this study the 1997 Russian Labor Force Survey is used to investigate wage differentials between the state and the private sector in the city of Moscow. Our analysis demonstrates that substantial differences exist between private and state sector wages. We estimate the gap between private and state sector wages to be 14.3 percent for men and 18.3 percent for women. We also find gender differences in wages. Men in the private sector earn on average 23.7 percent more than women. The gender wage gap in the state sector is even higher at 32.5 percent. In the state sector, wages for both men and women increase as years of tenure increase. But in the private sector this is only true for men; women earn no return to tenure. The probability of employment in the private sector decreases with age and tenure. Copyright 2004 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

In this study we use the newly available Yugoslavian Labor Force Survey data to investigate wage differentials and employment decisions in the state and private sectors in Yugoslavia. For the analysis we use three empirical models that rely on different statistical assumptions. We extend the standard switching regression model to allow non-normality in the joint distribution of the error terms. After correcting for the sector selection bias and controlling for workers' characteristics we find a private sector wage advantage. The wage premium is largest for workers with low education levels and declining for workers with higher educational levels. Given the regulatory and tax policies that pushed the private sector into the informal sphere of the economy during the period covered by our data, we argue that the state/private wage gap is likely to grow in the future. This will make it increasingly difficult for the state sector to attract and retain highly skilled employees.JEL classifications: J3, J4, P2.

This paper uses the second phase of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey to investigate the changes in expenditure inequality and instability in Russia between the autumn of 1994 and the autumn of 1998. The expenditure distribution is stable in spite of the economic and political turmoil Russia is going through. However, that does not imply much stability. Households experienced considerable fluctuations in their expenditure, with over 60 percent of the population's expenditure either more than doubling or falling to less than half their previous levels. Only about 6 percent of all households experienced an expenditure shock of less than 10 percent. The inquiry in expenditure mobility suggests high levels of transitory variation in the expenditure and high levels of instability.

Economic transition in Russia was accompanied by a precipitous decline in real income for most of the population. This article analyzes how the decline affected people's perception of the minimum level of income needed to make ends meet. Individual-level data collected from repeated surveys between March 1993 and September 1996 reveal that the elasticity of subjective minimum income with respect to actual median income was 1.5 or that people's subjective estimate of the minimum income for an adult Russian fell about 1.7 percent each month. This sharp reduction in the face of a decrease in real income meant that the percentage of the population who felt that they were poor declined, even though poverty remained at a very high level (more than 60 percent of the population) throughout the period. This self-perception is in marked contrast to an "objective " measure of poverty: the percentage of the population whose income was less than a given real poverty line rose.

Change in the PerceptionRussia experienced a precipitous drop in real of the Poverty Line during income from March 1993 to Times of Depression September 1996. As the percentage of the *" objectively" poor (those with Russia 1993-96 income below the official poverty line) increased, the percentage of the Branko Milanovic "asubjectively" poor (those Branko Jovanovic who felt poor) decreased. Perception of the subjective poverty line went down even faster than real incomes.