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Human impacts on large-scale ecological interactions effectively confer fundamental advantages of wealth and power to some members of society and not to others. As illustrated here by reference to a 1993 cholera outbreak resulting from degradation of aquatic ecosystems, these impacts can pose barriers to the normal channels through which one might pursue individual advantage, thereby raising tensions for liberal theories of justice that are committed both to basic liberties and to distributive fairness. I first illustrate these tensions by reference to John Rawls's theory. I then argue that although Nussbaum's theory, which emerged in dialogue with Rawls's, improves upon it in this regard, it remains subject to the same basic tensions. Instituting 'capability ceilings' that impose a limit on the set of basic opportunities available to people would help resolve this tension. Thus, in addition to Nussbaum's proposal for establishing capability thresholds, I defend capability ceilings as a friendly amendment to her theory.John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, Justice, Capabilities, Environmental justice, Ecosystems, Political liberalism, Value conflict, Habitat change, Resource inequality,

What principles should guide how society distributes environmental benefits and burdens? Like many liberal theories of justice, Martha Nussbaum's “capabilities approach” does not adequately address this question. The author argues that the capabilities approach should be extended to account for the environment's instrumental value to human capabilities. Given this instrumental value, protecting capabilities requires establishing certain environmental conditions as an independent “meta-capability.” When combined with Nussbaum's nonprocedural method of political justification, this extension provides the basis for adjudicating environmental justice claims. The author applies this extended capabilities approach to assess the distribution of benefits and burdens associated with climate change.

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