organizations that rely on open-source interpreted programming languages for different internal and external applications. Attackers can infiltrate well-defended organization by simply subverting the software supply chain of registries. For example, eslint-scope [4], a package with millions of weekly downloads in Npm, was compromised to steal credentials from developers. Similarly, rest-client [5], which has over one hundred million downloads in RubyGems, was compromised to leave a Remote-Code-Execution (RCE) backdoor on web servers. These attacks demonstrate how miscreants can covertly gain access to a wide-range of organizations by carrying out a software supply chain attack. Security researchers [7] are aware of these attacks and have proposed several solutions to address the rise of malicious software in registries. Zimmermann et al. [8] systematically studied 609 known security issues and revealed a large attack surface in the Npm ecosystem. BreakApp [9], on the other hand, isolates untrusted packages, which addresses credential theft and prevents access to sensitive data, but does not stop cryptocurrency mining or backdoors. Additionally, many solutions [10]-[12] assume inherent trust and focus on finding bugs in packages rather than malicious packages. To make matters worse, some attacks are very sinister and use social engineering techniques [13], [14] to disguise themselves by first publishing a "useful" package, then waiting until it is used by their target to update it and include malicious payloads. Although, many security researchers are actively investigating attacks on registries and proposing solutions, these approaches seem to be ad-hoc and one-off solutions. A better approach is to understand the extent of the software supply chain abuse and how miscreants are taking advantage of them. The approach must be grounded to allow an objective comparison between the different registry ecosystem. To this end, we propose a framework that highlights key functionality, security mechanisms, stakeholders, and remediation techniques to comparatively analyze different registry ecosystems. We use our framework to look at what features registries provide, what security principles are enforced, how is trust delegated between different parties, and what remediation and contingency plans registries have in place for post-attack. We leverage our findings to provide practical action items that registry maintainers can enforce using pre-existing tools and security principles that will improve the security of the overall package management ecosystem. Using well-known program analysis techniques, we build MALOSS, a custom pipeline tailored for interpreted languages that we use to empirically study the security of package managers. We make this pipeline Abstract-Package managers have become a vital part of the modern software development process. They allow developers to reuse third-party code, share their own code, minimize their codebase, and simplify the build process. However, recent reports showed that package manag...

Mobile application developers rely heavily on opensource software (OSS) to offload common functionalities such as the implementation of protocols and media format playback. Over the past years, several vulnerabilities have been found in popular open-source libraries like OpenSSL and FFmpeg. Mobile applications that include such libraries inherit these flaws, which make them vulnerable. Fortunately, the open-source community is responsive and patches are made available within days. However, mobile application developers are often left unaware of these flaws. The App Security Improvement Program (ASIP) is a commendable effort by Google to notify application developers of these flaws, but recent work has shown that many developers do not act on this information. Our work addresses vulnerable mobile applications through automatic binary patching from source patches provided by the OSS maintainers and without involving the developers. We propose novel techniques to overcome difficult challenges like patching feasibility analysis, source-code-to-binary-code matching, and in-memory patching. Our technique uses a novel variabilityaware approach, which we implement as OSSPATCHER. We evaluated OSSPATCHER with 39 OSS and a collection of 1,000 Android applications using their vulnerable versions. OSSPATCHER generated 675 function-level patches that fixed the affected mobile applications without breaking their binary code. Further, we evaluated 10 vulnerabilities in popular apps such as Chrome with public exploits, which OSSPATCHER was able to mitigate and thwart their exploitation.

Kernel minimization has already been established as a practical approach to reducing the trusted computing base. Existing solutions have largely focused on whole-system profiling -generating a globally minimum kernel image that is being shared by all applications. However, since different applications use only part of the kernel's code base, the minimized kernel still includes an unnecessarily large attack surface. Furthermore, once the static minimized kernel is generated, it is not flexible enough to adapt to an altered execution environment (e.g., new workload). FACE-CHANGE is a virtualization-based system to facilitate dynamic switching at runtime among multiple minimized kernels, each customized for an individual application. Based on precedent profiling results, FACE-CHANGE transparently presents a customized kernel view for each application to confine its reachability of kernel code. In the event that the application exceeds this boundary, FACE-CHANGE is able to recover the missing code and backtrace its attack/exception provenance to analyze the anomalous behavior.

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