Do state supreme courts act impartially or are they swayed by public opinion? Do judicial elections influence judge behavior? To date these questions have received little direct attention due to the absence of comparable public opinion data in states and obstacles to collecting data necessary for comprehensive analysis of state supreme court outcomes. Advances in measurement, data archiving, and methodology now allow for consideration of the link between public opinion and judicial outcomes in the American states. The analysis presented considers public opinion's influence on the composition of courts (indirect effects) and its influence on judge votes in capital punishment cases (direct effects). In elective state supreme courts, public support for capital punishment influences the ideological composition of those courts and judge willingness to uphold death sentences. Notably, public support for capital punishment has no measurable effect on nonelective state supreme courts. On the highly salient issue of the death penalty, mass opinion and the institution of electing judges systematically influence court composition and judge behavior.

Elections in the American states are important mechanisms for legitimizing state governments by facilitating the involvement of citizens in electing political leaders. Elections, however, receive scrutiny through challenges in state courts on issues such as contested elections and the structure and context of election ballots. Capitalizing on attention to the role of leadership in institutional maintenance, the analysis presented examines the effects of leadership and other essential political and legal characteristics on building decision consensus in election cases. An empirical test using 203 election decisions by state supreme courts from 1995 to 1998 illustrates that, among other factors, the authority of leadership facilitates consensus where considered jointly with the resources of courts, the state as a litigant, and internal rules that prioritize seniority.

Two important perspectives on courts highlight fundamentally different elements of adjudication and yield distinct predictions about judicial outcomes. The Attitudinal Model of judicial voting posits judge ideology as a strong predictor of court outcomes. Alternatively, the Law and Economics perspective focuses on the settlement behavior of litigants and reasons that while judges may vote ideologically, litigants adapt to these ideological proclivities, nullifying the effect of judge ideology. This analysis focuses on reconciling expectations about the effects of judge ideology and litigant strategies by examining their contingent nature and the conditioning effects of institutional design. The analysis examines state supreme courts from 1995–1998 to identify empirical evidence supporting both perspectives. While some state supreme courts have discretionary dockets allowing judges greater opportunities to exercise their ideology, others lack discretionary docket control, making dockets and outcomes largely litigant driven. Support for each perspective largely hinges on this fundamental feature of institutional design.

expenditures per capita were $1,821-$5,267 more than the next highest spending country (Switzerland) and $3,074 more than the median OECD country (Anderson et al. 2005).The sentence should read:In 2002, U.S. health expenditures per capita were $5,267-$1,821 more than the next highest spending country (Switzerland) and $3,074 more than the median OECD country (Anderson et al. 2005).

Capitalizing on attention directed to judicial agreement and the associated consequences of judicial elections, this article conducts an examination of the effects of seniority and state methods of judicial retention on decisions by state supreme court justices to dissent. Copyright (c) 2010 by the Southwestern Social Science Association.