Religion is an important influence on adult attitudes toward European integration, as devout Catholics strongly support integration, while committed Protestants are less enthusiastic. Here we consider whether this relationship holds for reputedly secularized European youth. Using Eurobarometer 47.2OVR, we show that devout Catholic and Orthodox youth do in fact support the European Union, as do committed Protestants, and generically religious youths, but at lower levels. Atheists and agnostics are more critical of the EU. High levels of social capital and pro-immigration sentiments also predict euro-enthusiasm. We conclude by analysing the variation in youth attitudes across Member States.

Recent years have seen a proliferation of studies on the determinants of support for the European Union among national publics. Scholars have analyzed economic, political, informational, and identity factors as influences, but there has been less exploration of cultural factors, most notably religion. This article replicates our earlier studies exploring the impact of confessional culture and religious commitment on support for the European Union, expanding the purview from early member states to more recent accessions and candidates for membership. Using Eurobarometer 65.2 (Papacostas 2006), we demonstrate that religion still shapes attitudes toward European integration, but in varying ways and to different extents in several parts of the Union. In early member states, Catholicsespecially committed onesare more supportive of the European Union than Protestants, confirming earlier findings. In more recent accessions, however, religion's impact is weaker and assumes different configurations. Finally, we present evidence that even in the early member states religion is losing its influence over Europeanist sentiment and suggest that this development presents obstacles to further political integration.Religion and politics may not mix well at dinner parties, but they undoubtedly interact in the real world of European governance. Recent examples abound. Early in this decade, religious and secular forces fought a pitched battle over proposals to mention Christianity as a source of values in the new European Constitution. Not long after, the European Parliament

We attempt to further the `normal' study of public opinion in the European Union (EU) by examining the relationship of gender to attitudes toward integration. Using Eurobarometer 42 we demonstrate that a modest gender gap exists, with women being less enthusiastic about the EU than men. We then construct a model to explain male and female attitudes using measures of political distance, women's values, ideology, economic vulnerability and national tradition. Women's attitudes are more sensitive to knowledge about the EU and to economic pessimism than men's, while men's attitudes are determined more by interest in politics, traditionalist values, ideology, and working-class status. We conclude by analyzing interesting differences that emerge when respondents are grouped by `type of welfare state'.

This article focuses on the political participation of ministers from five evangelical Protestant denominations that differ in theology, polity, and history. Despite such differences, these clergy respond to political influences in much the same fashion. We find that the standard theories of political participation have varying success in accounting for their political involvement. Sociodemographic explanations provide little help, but psychological engagement with politics has more explanatory power. Professional role orientations are the best predictors of actual participation. And the clergy who see moral reform issues as the most important confronting the country—and who hold conservative views on such issues—are most likely to become engaged. Finally, membership in Christian Right organizations serves to elicit more activity than might occur if ministers were left to internally motivated participation. Despite the emphasis on other contextual variables in some work on clerical politics, we find that communications exposures, congregational influences, and even the support of clerical colleagues have very limited independent effects on political involvement.

This paper considers the relationship between Europeans' religious characteristics and support for the European Union. Using Eurobarometer data from the 1970s through the 1990s, we find that Catholics have been far stronger supporters of European integration than Protestants have, and that the devout in both traditions have been more in favor of the integration process than have nominal adherents. The effects of religion survive both longitudinal and intensive cross-sectional analyses incorporating alternative explanations for support of the EU. These findings suggest that, if religion is declining as a social and political force, underlying support for European unity may also be dwindling. Public approval of the European Union may thus depend increasingly on the economic performance of national governments and of the Union itself.