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SUMMARYThis article addresses possible approaches to solving the problem of climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHGE). It considers some of the core science on climate change, leading to a discussion of market failure, government failure and externalities. The European Union's emissions trading scheme (ETS) is cited as an example of a failure in an environment of both market failure and government failure. The discussion then focuses on carbon costing and pricing, the design features of a carbon tax and the main advantages of a carbon tax over an ETS.

This paper considers the inter-professional rivalries that took place as the Australian federal government attempted to register a pool of greenhouse and energy auditors and establish a multidisciplinary team structure for emissions-related reporting and trading schemes from 2007-2019. Drawing on the notions of trials (Callon 1986;Latour 1987) and criticism in trials (Bourguignon & Chiapello 2005), we show how the government's attempts in classifying and determining expert roles and responsibilities from engineering, environmental, and financial backgrounds -with a preference for Big 4 accountants in leadership roles -triggered a series of multi-lateral trials of strength and responsibility, and essentially failed to meet its original purpose. By following the regulatory process, we articulate how terminology and measurement devices were mobilised by the regulator to enrol mixed expertise. We also examine how the envisaged identities, roles, and responsibilities were received by lobbyists from the three expert groups, and then how their concern, criticism, and resistance were acted upon and reacted to by the regulator. Our study reveals the dilemma the non-expert government faced in mediating the conflicting interests and goals of the three expert groups while fulfilling its regulatory and administrative roles. Our analysis shows how accountants' supervision style of delegating technical work and routines to subordinates evoked further controversy. The study contributes to our understanding of how trials between conflicting claims and criticisms influenced the shaping of auditor identities and responsibilities. The lessons learned in Australia provide useful insights into many other regulatory regimes in multidisciplinary fields.

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