Behavioral accounting researchers have historically been constrained in their ability to reach externally valid research participants. The purpose of this paper is to familiarize researchers with two relatively new and innovative ways to overcome this issue. First, this paper discusses two online instrument delivery services provided by SurveyMonkey and Qualtrics that can be used to distribute experimental materials to geographically distributed participants quickly and inexpensively. Second, it reviews a number of participant recruitment services that behavioral accounting researchers can use to identify and recruit externally valid research participants. Specifically, this paper discusses commercial participant recruitment services provided by SurveyMonkey Audience, Qualtrics, Amazon's Mechanical Turk, and other commercial firms, as well as several non-commercial participant recruitment services associated with industry and professional organizations. Each service is evaluated against three criteria that are important to behavioral accounting researchers: (1) cost, (2) flexibility, and (3) access to populations of interest.

This study examines the relationship between institutional pressures to provide social benefits and the discretionary accrual behavior of nonprofit firms. I examine this issue within the context of U.S. nonprofit hospitals, an economically significant and politically rich setting where firms face considerable institutional pressure to provide an important social benefit: charity care. I argue that institutional pressures on nonprofits to provide higher levels of social benefits imply that lower profits should be reported. I develop theory and provide evidence which suggests that, due to competing private incentives to report higher profits, nonprofit managers strategically use discretionary accruals to increase accounting earnings when the social benefits their firms have provided in the current period exceed external stakeholders' normative expectations. The findings from this study inform the ongoing political debate regarding the appropriateness of tax exemptions for U.S. nonprofit hospitals and should therefore be of interest to both regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides timely insights for researchers regarding how institutional pressures can affect managers' reporting behaviors in other settings where similar competing reporting incentives exist between managers' private benefits and stakeholder expectations related to social benefits.

In this study, we examine the effects of tax avoidance and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities on equity market valuation. Economic theory suggests that managers should avoid taxes through any legal means (Friedman 1970), and that CSR activities are of value to the extent that shareholder wealth is maximized (Hales, Matsumura, Moser, and Payne 2016). We hypothesize that while equity market participants may positively value both CSR and tax avoidance, these two actions are viewed as inconsistent with one another when engaged upon contemporaneously, where increased activity of one diminishes the value of the other. Results, using a sample of U.S. public firms during years 2000–2013, support our expectation and show a negative interaction between CSR and tax avoidance. A series of robustness checks provide additional evidence consistent with investors viewing CSR and tax avoidance as contradictory. JEL Classifications: G32; M41; M49; M410. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Subjective performance evaluation systems often prescribe for evaluators to use multiple measures to assess overall subordinate performance. Firms can choose to explicitly provide suggested weights to “balance” the relative weight evaluators place on each measure. However, we theorize that doing so may also affect evaluators' perceptions regarding the extent to which the firm intends for them to exercise subjectivity in their evaluations. We conducted an experiment in which evaluators use four measures to subjectively evaluate a subordinate's overall performance. Evaluators were also provided with relevant non-contractible information, although evaluators were not explicitly required to consider this information. We find that the provision of weights reduces the extent to which evaluators employ subjectivity to incorporate non-contractible information, which is manifested in larger outcome effects. Our results suggest firms should carefully consider what the structure and characteristics of their performance evaluation systems communicate to evaluators regarding the role of subjectivity.

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