This study adds to the literature on corporate governance and corporate financial performance by assessing the effect of board composition on the financial performance of listed firms in Ghana. Using a static panel regression model, the results show that contrary to the agency theory, inside directors tend to have a positive and significant effect on corporate financial performance whilst outside directors have a negative but statistically insignificant effect on corporate financial performance of the listed firms in Ghana. In addition, it was found that the existence of nomination committees tend to have a negative effect on corporate financial performance of listed firms in Ghana. The study recommends that listed firms in Ghana should look at how to continuously empower inside directors to be able to perform their work well instead of bringing in more outside directors to check them. Moreover, the nomination process of board members must be made transparent to achieve the objective of recruiting competent and ethical minded executives to the board. Guidelines for executive recruitment to the board must be established and if possible the nomination committee must employ the services of executive-hunting agency which would assist the committee in the recruitment process.

This study looks at the effects of ownership structure and the risk-taking behaviour of banks in Ghana. Using data from 21 banks during 2000–2010, the study employs random effects panel data regressions. The results show that banks prefer to hold high excess reserves instead of lending to borrowers when they perceive the markets to be risky. Locally owned banks tend to be more efficient in managing their risk than foreign-owned banks, while closed corporations tend to perform better in managing risk than locally owned banks. JEL Classification: G21, G31, G28, O16