Many political philosophers contend that citizens have a moral obligation to vote. Those who do not ignore important values, are wrongfully complicit in injustice, and undermine the foundations of democracy. Others argue that given the insignificance of individual ballots, voting is too costly to be rational, much less obligatory. This chapter develops an alternative account of civic ethics that avoids the unattractive features of both these positions. Citizens, it argues, do not have a duty to vote. But this is not because voting is morally insignificant. Instead, it is because the act is non-unique. Rather than having a duty to go to the polls, citizens instead have a responsibility to do their share of civic work—a class of actions that includes but is not limited to voting. Many can satisfy this duty without casting a ballot. However, those who take this option do not float free of obligation; they must satisfy it in other forms. Our mistake, the chapter shows, has been treating voting as a distinct morally significant act rather than as one component of a complex joint project to which citizens bear responsibility. Rectifying this error makes possible a more nuanced and complete account of civic ethics, one that can unify previously discordant philosophical debates and speak to the complexity of real-world political institutions.

Any decent mechanic does more for society by fixing cars than paying taxes. (David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice) Since you have been born and brought up and educated, could you say that you were not our offspring and our slave from the beginning. . .? (Plato, Crito) Fred owns an auto dealership. He is kind to children, bakes brownies for neighbors, and feeds stray cats. He also does not pay his taxes. Fred lives in a well-functioning democracy that respects human rights. His refusal is not an act of protest. He simply wants the money. One of the most common explanations for why Fred's behavior is wrong is that disobedience violates duties of reciprocity. 1 As H.L.A. Hart writes, "when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those For immensely helpful encouragement and discussion I would like to thank Ya'ir

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