This study aims is to investigate the synchronicity levels of shares traded on the spot market of the São Paulo Stock, Commodities, and Futures Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA) in relation to the accounting convergence process towards International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Brazil. The term synchronicity refers to the amount that company-specific information and market information are reflected in stock prices. The more share prices reflect company-specific information rather than market information, the greater the informational content of these prices will be in terms of representing the economic value of a particular company. For this investigation, information on companies and shares from 2005 to 2015 was collected, excluding the financial sector. The data were analyzed using cross-sectional and panel regressions. The results indicate a reduction in the synchronicity levels of stocks in the period of full adoption of IFRS in Brazil from 2010 onwards. From 2008 to 2009, which includes the partial adoption of IFRS in Brazil, statistically significant results were not found for the synchronicity levels of shares. However, for times of financial crisis, evidence was found of a reduction in the relevance of accounting information even with the adoption of international accounting standards. The results obtained for the Brazilian context do not support the idea that the adoption of IFRS necessarily causes an increase in the informational content of financial statements and that relevant information is consequently reflected in stock prices.

Purpose This study aims to investigate how different executive compensation structures were related to the performance of firms. Design/methodology/approach This study was based on a sample of companies with the highest standards of corporate governance listed on the Brazilian Stock Exchange. We adopted the multiple correspondence analysis followed by the hierarchical cluster analysis to propose a typology defined by fixed and variable components of the executive compensation and multiple firm performance indicators. Findings The analysis produced three clusters, which were submitted to robustness tests, highlighting that companies used the compensatory incentives in striking distinct ways as governance mechanisms. The study found a positive relationship between the performance of companies and the variable incentives of executive compensation, especially the long-term incentive, as well as a negative relationship between the performance of firms and the fixed component of the compensation structure. Research limitations/implications This research, whose sample was based on an emerging market, adds empirical evidence to the literature. However, future studies are invited to address the relationships between executive compensation structures and firm performance in other markets, as well as to examine these relationships in companies with distinct levels of governance. Practical implications This study provides insights on how the incentive structure can be adopted as an efficient governance mechanism, especially for companies in emerging markets. Originality/value The main novelty of this paper is that the methodological strategy used here enabled the authors to discriminate distinct executive compensation structures and establish a relationship between these compensation structures and different types of performance indicators.

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