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Why have Singapore’s unique developmental state arrangements persisted in a region which has experienced democratic change? This paper argues that this is due to the PAP state’s successful legitimation of its unique brand of meritocracy, one which has both competitive and interventionist elements. During the colonial era, a culture of economic meritocracy evolved in a bottom-up process through social and commercial interactions between the British class and Chinese community. This was then transmuted by the PAP’s top-down imposition of the institutions and discourses of political meritocracy. This cultural hybrid allows the state to sustain its hegemony in the face of progressive social change. Accordingly, our emphasis on the wider institutional environment within which merit is conceived helps to better illuminate Singapore’s challenges of encouraging organic innovation, alleviating social stratification, and opening up its political arena. This paper suggests that the problems in these areas stem not from meritocracy per se, but from the PAP’s “monocentric meritocracy” where merit is narrowly defined and singularly imposed in the post-colonial era.

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This article explores the limits of central industrial planning through a case study of Singapore. While previous Austrian scholars have argued that successful industrial planning is impossible, and that its successes (if any) are limited to the resolution of technical problems, the positive economic record of Singapore under the auspices of its developmental state capitalism poses a strong challenge to these market-oriented perspectives.In response, I present a modest position. I concede that Singapore’s industrial policy has to some extent contributed to genuine economic development but insist that its state-heavy approach has nonetheless hampered the market’s entrepreneurial discovery by stifling local entrepreneurial talent and crowding out local small-medium enterprises. The top-down model has also limited the economy’s adaptive potential. I draw from productivity, entrepreneurship, and innovation data to make my case and conclude that Singapore’s experience with its developmental state model comes with a significant cost, notwithstanding its impressive achievements.