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In a series of recent articles, Jakob Rigi has formulated an articulate and sophisticated Marxian view about the relationship between digital production and value theory. Anyone interested in the economic dynamics of FAMGA (Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Google and Amazon) needs to come to terms with the position Rigi stakes out. In this article, I challenge Rigi’s thesis that profits from the sale of digital information (DI) constitute rent. I do so by calling into question his conclusions concerning the valuelessness of DI. After summarising Rigi’s core position and sketching out its entailments, I make the case that (1) Rigi’s assertions about the intrinsic valuelessness of DI are not supported by the model of production he invokes; that (2) Rigi’s valuelessness argument in fact presupposes that DI has value; that (3) far from furnishing evidence that DI is valueless and therefore a source of rent income, as Rigi holds, the existence of the intellectual property regime is precisely what allows DI to act as a congealment of value (i.e. labour time) in commodity form; and that (4) Rigi misapplies Marx’s notion of reproduction to the sale/copy/distribution of DI. I offer this critique as an invitation for us to rethink, from a Marxian perspective, the status of the digital economy within the order of global capitalist value production.

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In chapter 5 of his Autobiography, John Stuart Mill recounts a crisis in his mental history. The details of Mill’s depression and eventual rehabilitation due to the salutary powers of lyric poetry are well known. But most scholars who have investigated the status of poetry in Mill’s philosophy have overlooked the fact that the story the Autobiography tells about poetry’s contribution to Mill’s spiritual convalescence and moral education raises several interesting interpretive issues and leaves many notable questions unanswered. I begin with an overview of Mill’s psychological case history as presented in the Autobiography. After that I turn my attention to some exegetical difficulties surrounding Mill’s adulation for poetry and the aesthetic experience. While it is clear that Mill thinks poetry has important moral consequences for the individual, and is crucial in the formation of character and conscience, his views about why poetry is of outstanding significance in this respect are less than transparent and have to be reconstructed on the basis of his more developed literary, ethical, and psychological theories. I take issue with two such reconstructions that appear in the secondary literature and present an alternative to them.