Internal contamination by actinides following wounding may occur in nuclear fuel industry workers or subsequent to terrorist activities, causing dissemination of radioactive elements. Contamination by alpha particle emitting actinides can result in pathological effects, either local or distant from the site of entry. The objective of the present study was to develop a robust experimental approach in the rat for short- and long- term actinide contamination following wounding by incision of the skin and muscles of the hind limb. Anesthetized rats were contaminated with Mixed OXide (MOX, uranium, plutonium oxides containing 7.1% plutonium) or plutonium nitrate (Pu nitrate) following wounding by deep incision of the hind leg. Actinide excretion and tissue levels were measured as well as histological changes from 2 h to 3 mo. Humid swabs were used for rapid evaluation of contamination levels and proved to be an initial guide for contamination levels. Although the activity transferred from wound to blood is higher after contamination with a moderately soluble form of plutonium (nitrate), at 7 d most of the MOX (98%) or Pu nitrate (87%) was retained at the wound site. Rapid actinide retention in liver and bone was observed within 24 h, which increased up to 3 mo. After MOX contamination, a more rapid initial urinary excretion of americium was observed compared with plutonium. At 3 mo, around 95% of activity remained at the wound site, and excretion of Pu and Am was extremely low. This experimental approach could be applied to other situations involving contamination following wounding including rupture of the dermal, vascular, and muscle barriers.

The Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) established a laboratory network within the GHSI community to develop collective surge capacity for radionuclide bioassay in response to a radiological or nuclear emergency as a means of enhancing response capability, health outcomes and community resilience. GHSI partners conducted an exercise in collaboration with the WHO REMPAN (Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness and Assistance Network) and the IAEA RANET (Response and Assistance Network), to test the participating laboratories (18) for their capabilities in in vitro assay of biological samples, using a urine sample spiked with multiple high-risk radionuclides (90Sr, 106Ru, 137Cs, and 239Pu). Laboratories were required to submit their reports within 72 hours following receipt of the sample, using a pre-formatted template, on the procedures, methods and techniques used to identify and quantify the radionuclides in the sample, as well as the bioassay results with a 95% confidence interval. All of the participating laboratories identified and measured all or some of the radionuclides in the sample. However, gaps were identified in both the procedures used to assay multiple radionuclides in one sample, as well as in the methods or techniques used to assay specific radionuclides in urine. Two third of the participating laboratories had difficulties in determining all the radionuclides in the sample. Results from this exercise indicate that challenges remain with respect to ensuring that results are delivered in a timely, consistent and reliable manner to support medical interventions. Laboratories within the networks are encouraged to work together to develop and maintain collective capabilities and capacity for emergency bioassay, which is an important component of radiation emergency response.

The Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) established a laboratory network within the GHSI community to develop collective surge capacity for radionuclide bioassay in response to a radiological or nuclear emergency. A recent exercise was conducted to test the participating laboratories for their capabilities in screening and in vitro assay of biological samples, performing internal dose assessment, and providing advice on medical intervention, if necessary, using a urine sample spiked with a single radionuclide, 241Am. Laboratories were required to submit their reports according to the exercise schedule and using pre-formatted templates. Generally, the participating laboratories were found to be capable with respect to rapidly screening samples for radionuclide contamination, measuring the radionuclide in the samples, assessing the intake and radiation dose, and providing advice on medical intervention. However, gaps in bioassay measurement and dose assessment have been identified. The network may take steps to ensure that procedures and practices within this network be harmonized and a follow-up exercise be organized on a larger scale, with potential participation of laboratories from the networks coordinated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Health Organization (WHO).