The authors compared several Australian subgroups and American college students on their preferences for Australian natural landscapes. Preference correlations across groups were generally high, with the correlations for Australian adults somewhat lower. Factor analysis yielded six perceptual categories: Vegetation, Open Smooth, Open Coarse, Rivers, Agrarian, and Structures. Both the Australian and American samples liked Rivers best and the Open categories least. Only the Australians included willow trees in the Agrarian category. The Australians liked the settings overall better than the Americans. Among the Australians, primary students liked the settings most, secondary students least; aboriginal college students liked the settings better than other college groups, but they disliked the Structures category; and DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) staff members liked the settings better than other Australian adults but, unlike other adults, did not like willows better than nonwillow settings. Cultural and evolutionary reasons for the complex pattern of results were explored.

Researchers assume that time pressure impairs performance in decision tasks by invoking heuristic processes. In the present study, the authors inquired (a) whether it was possible in some cases for time pressure to improve performance or to alter it without impairing it, and (b) whether the heuristic invoked by base-rate neglect under direct experience can be identified. They used a probability-learning design in 2 experiments, and they measured the choice proportions after each of 2 possible cues in each experiment. In 1 comparison, time pressure increased predictions of the more likely outcome, which improved performance. In 2 comparisons, time pressure changed the choice proportions without affecting performance. In a 4th comparison, time pressure hindered performance. The choice proportions were consistent with heuristic processing that is based on cue matching rather than on cue accuracy, base rates, or posterior probabilities.

In 3 experiments, the authors tested the conditions under which 3rd variables are controlled for in making causal judgments. The authors hypothesized that 3rd variables are controlled for when the 3rd variables are themselves perceived as causal. In Experiment 1, the participants predicted test performance after seeing information about wearing a lucky garment, taking a test-preparation course, and staying up late. The course (perceived as more causally relevant) was controlled for more than was the garment (perceived as less causally relevant) in assessing the effectiveness of staying up late. In Experiments 2 and 3, to obviate the many alternative accounts that arise from the realistic cover story of Experiment 1, participants predicted flowers' blooming after the presentation or nonpresentation of liquids. When one liquid was trained as causal, it was controlled for more in judging another liquid than when it was trained as neutral. Overall, stimuli perceived as causal were controlled for more when judging other stimuli. The authors concluded that the effect of perceived causal relevance on causal conditionalizing is real and normatively reasonable.

The Proximity Compatibility Principle (PCP) states that a display format is well-suited to a given task if the information sources in the display are related to the same degree as information sources in the task. While experiments have shown that PCP can provide useful display design guidelines for many types of tasks, diagnosis tasks have not seemed to conform to PCP's predictions. The current experiment compared performance with integral, configural, and separable displays in three diagnosis tasks based on a medical diagnosis technique. As predicted, the integral display allowed the best performance. The results indicate that PCP is a useful theory for diagnosis tasks, but different diagnosis tasks can differ widely in their task demands.

The purpose of this study is to collect data on decision makers' use of environmental cues and situation awareness levels in a decision-making scenario. In a given situation, information cues are typically associated with implicit weight values that allow the decision maker to make sense of the current environment, as well as make judgments about a future event. There is some evidence that during situations in which cues may actually fluctuate in importance, decision makers may not assign cue weights accurately. It would follow that situation awareness may also be lower than when weights accurately reflect cue values present in the environment. The goal of this study was to explore whether there was a relationship between the patterns of cue utilization and levels of situation awareness in a dynamic computerized flight simulation, TIDE2. In addition, correlational analyses were conducted between measurements of cognitive style, situation awareness level measurements, and judgment accuracy. Evidence for these relationships was found.