Scientistic conceptualisations hold to the positivistic positions that science is limitless in its potential representations of material phenomena and that it is the only sure path to knowledge. In recent popular scientific literature, these presuppositions have been reaffirmed to the detriment of both philosophy and theology. This article argues for the contrary position by a meta-analysis of empirical science from a Thomist perspective. Identifying empirical science as limited in its method and bound to the material sphere of being alone, we posit that rather than standing as the sole path to the knowledge of being, empirical science is constrained at its frontiers. It is subsequently contended that far from empirical science having the explanatory ability to respond to all presenting scientific problems in principle, fundamentals without the grasp of the methodology of empirical science exist. To relate the article’s meta-analysis to scientific praxis, physical cosmology – as the most foundational empirical science – is exemplified in the discussion.Keywords: Philosophy; Religion; Science; Scientism; Thomism; Metaphysics; Epistemology

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[T]he question 'Why is there anything at all?' is quintessentially mystical … [in] that it apparently has no possibility of an answer. Whatever answer it would have to be something in the world, or else something other than the world, and the question would just reappear over the existence of that other thing. (Smart 1996:35-36) Introduction 1There are current schools of thought that consider 'hard' science as the resolution to the primordial metaphysical problem. Amongst these are the physicalists and their supporters, the 'New Atheists'.2 Physicalism, however, relies upon a misconceptualisation of the problem by reducing the emergence of being to empiricism, for in these accounts, being is construed as arising from a change in material form.3 Thus, physicalists conjecture that the 'problem of creation' is not metaphysical and can be removed from speculation as 'hard' science accounts for the emergence of being. 4 The physicalist position argues further that God's existence is impossible because there is no role for a creative agent in a self-causing cosmos.If, however, the physicalist position is problematised in terms of its own foundational metaphysical positions, some way toward the validation of metaphysics as relevant to the knowledge economy would have been obtained. In a stronger vein, metaphysics would be demonstrated as irremovable as it concerns the very foundation of being. 5 The following problem would then ensue: If metaphysics is not removable, is it reasonable to postulate that a primary, metaphysical cause brought about contingent being within space-time?1.Some of the ideas in this article were initially developed in the author's D.Phil. (Philosophy) at the University of Pretoria.2.'"Why does something exist rather than nothing?" … [G]iven that things have to exist, we may be able to give a reason why they have to exist as they are …' (Leibniz [1698(Leibniz [ ] 2006. The physicalist response is demonstrated in the following citations: 'The spontaneous genesis of something out of nothing happened in a big way at the beginning of space and time, in the singularity known as the Big Bang followed by the inflationary period …' (Dawkins in Krauss 2012:189). 'We can describe the evolution of the universe back to the earliest possible moments of the Big Bang without specific need for anything beyond known physical laws …' (Krauss 2012:145). '[T]he beginning of the universe was governed by the laws of science and doesn't need to be set in motion by some god' (Hawking & Mlodinow 2010:135).3.An example of this argument is the theory that the initial singularity emerged out of quantum fluctuation (Davies 1998:233-235). 4.'[O]ur real problem will not be to understand the beginning of the universe, or even to decide whether there really was a beginning …' (Weinberg 1993:191 Primary causality: In defence of the metaphysical rationality of faith in God as CreatorSupport has been lent to contemporary 'New Atheism' from physicalist interpretations of 'hard' science. From this perspective, any system of...

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Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: Bringing the Christian metaphysics and epistemology of Aquinas and Solovyov into conversation, which the author has not seen done in other literature, this work brings together Epistemology and Metaphysics, leading to a unified practical application in the critique of issue within contemporary Philosophy of Science, scientism.