Attack generation from an abstract model of a protocol is not an easy task. We present BIFROST (Bifrost Implements Formally Reliable prOtocols for Security and Trust), a tool that takes an abstract model of a cryptographic protocol and outputs an implementation in C of the protocol and either a proof in ProVerif that the protocol is safe or an implementation of the attack found. We use FS2PV, KaRaMeL, ProVerif and a dedicated parser to analyze the attack traces produced by ProVerif. If an attack is found then BIFROST automatically produces C code for each honest participant and for the intruder in order to mount the attack.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.