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Hay (algo de) verdad en eso" Camillo Fiore Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina. Recibido el 20/1/2018; aceptado el 5/3/2018. ResumenEn este trabajo presento un tratamiento formal para la expresión "hay (algo de) verdad en eso". Adopto un lenguaje de primer orden y asumo una interpretación bivaluada. Sostengo que "hay (algo de) verdad en x" se comporta como una atribución de verdad parcial y no transparente. Argumento que debe ser modelada utilizando un predicado y no un operador. Introduzco un predicado y considero tres criterios alternativos para caracterizar su semántica. Pruebo que, con cualquiera de los criterios, el predicado trivializa toda teoría clásica que adopte un mecanismo de autorreferencia fuerte. AbstractIn this paper I present a formal treatment for the notion "there is (some) truth in that". I adopt a first order language and assume a bivalued interpretation. I claim that "there is (some) truth in x" behaves as a partial and not transparent truth attribution. I argue that it should be modeled using a predicate rather than an operator. I introduce a predicate and consider three alternative criteria to characterize its semantics. I prove that, with any of the criteria, the predicate trivializes any classical theory that adopts a strong self-referential procedure. I. IntroducciónLa atribución de verdad simple, "x es verdadero", es traducida al lenguaje formal mediante un predicado que se aplica a nombres de oraciones. Digamos, T. Hay consenso en que nuestro uso intuitivo de 'verdad' implica que T debe ser 'transparente' (Cfr. Barrio, 2014: 10). Si A es una oración y ˹A˺ es un nombre para A, debe darse que Palabras clave semántica formal predicado veritativo paradojas expresiones lógicas Keywords formal semantics truth predicate paradoxes logical expressions

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Saul Kripke proposed a skeptical challenge that Romina Padró defended and popularized by the name of the Adoption Problem. The challenge is that, given a certain definition of adoption, there are some logical principles that cannot be adopted—paradigmatic cases being Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens. Kripke has used the Adoption Problem to argue that there is an important sense in which logic is not revisable. In this essay, I defend two independent claims. First, that the Adoption Problem does not entail that logic is never revisable in the sense that Kripke addresses. Second, that, to assess whether an agent can revise their logic in the sense that Kripke addresses, it is best to consider a different definition of adoption, according to which Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens are sometimes adoptable.

Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an argument is valid in this logic just in case it necessarily preserves evidence. The authors appeal to this epistemic interpretation to briefly motivate a kind of logical pluralism: “different accounts of logical consequence may preserve different properties of propositions”. The aim of this paper is to study the prospect of a logical pluralism based on different interpretations of logical systems. First, we give our analysis of what it means to interpret a logic – and make some hopefully useful distinctions along the way. Second, we present what we call an interpretational logical pluralism: there is more than one correct logic and a logic is correct only if it has some adequate interpretation. We consider four variants of this idea, bring up some possible objections, and try to find plausible solutions on behalf of the pluralist. We will argue that interpretations of logical systems provide a promising – albeit not unproblematic – route to logical pluralism.