Background: The potential influence of methamphetamine use on neuropsychological functioning is unclear. The aim of this this meta-analysis was to investigate the relationship between abstinence and neuropsychological functioning in people with methamphetamine use disorder. Method: The systematic review protocol was registered with the International Prospective Register of Systematic Reviews (PROSPERO: CRD42018083598). Studies were eligible if they (a) included a group that identified methamphetamine as their primary substance of use, (b) comprised participants who reported a period of abstinence from methamphetamine, (c) included healthy comparison participants, (d) included outcome measures that constituted valid and reliable cognitive tests and, (e) were published in English. The search yielded effect sizes based on 1008 abstinent methamphetamine participants and 984 healthy comparison participants. Results: Findings revealed small-to-moderate effect sizes, indicating that methamphetamine participants performed somewhat below controls on learning efficiency, visual-spatial processing, comprehension knowledge, retrieval fluency, processing speed, and psychomotor speed. Three exceptions, in which performance demonstrated no group effect, were in domains of fluid reasoning, short-term working memory, and reaction and decision speed. Discussion: The current results support the hypothesis that methamphetamine use is associated with small-to-moderate cognitive sequelae that persist beyond a period of abstinence. However, we cannot determine whether methamphetamine use leads to long-term neuropsychological impairment via structural or functional brain changes, or whether preexisting deficits in neuropsychological performance and cortical integrity are vulnerability factors for methamphetamine use, or both. Taken together, the results suggest that strong statements regarding impaired cognitive functioning in abstinent methamphetamine users are premature.

Cognitive biases can permeate everyday clinical decision-making processes and adversely affect the accuracy of clinical judgments, even among the many practitioners who are capable, knowledgeable, and highly intelligent. Reviews summarizing the cognitive biases that affect clinical decision-making have largely targeted physicians rather than practicing psychologists. Further, much of the writing on this topic presumes a level of familiarity with technical aspects of the decision-making literature that may not be possessed by many practitioners. We present a contemporary and accessible introduction to the cognitive pitfalls that can adversely affect clinical decision-making for practicing psychologists, including clinical supervisors. We briefly review the dual-process model of cognition and describe biases, heuristics, and logical fallacies that are germane to a diverse range of clinical practices in psychology, along with clinically relevant examples. We conclude with a brief summary of the preliminary evidence for bias management strategies that may improve clinical accuracy. Owing in part to metabiases such as bias blind spot, practicing clinicians and supervisors should strive to acquire insight into their decisionmaking processes and learn how they can go awry. Public Significance StatementResearch suggests that cognitive biases are pervasive in mental health professionals' decisionmaking and can diminish the accuracy of clinical judgments, even among skilled practitioners. This user-friendly introduction reviews biases, heuristics, and logical fallacies that are particularly relevant to psychological practice and supervision. Decreasing reliance on working memory and bolstering psychoeducation may alleviate the effects of bias on clinical decision-making.

Reflective practice has gained traction in clinical psychology largely to address the fact that practitioners must frequently “use their heads” when scientific data are not readily available. Despite their widespread adoption, reflective practice techniques are largely lacking in supportive outcome evidence. We contend that the reflective practice literature has remained largely disconnected from basic psychological science, especially work on the limitations of (a) introspection as a means of becoming aware of one's biases, (b) self‐assessment, and (c) acquiring expertise from experience. To realize its potential, the reflective practice literature will need to forge closer connections with work on social cognition and debiasing, and to determine whether its techniques enhance patient outcomes and the validity of clinicians’ judgments and predictions.

Although several published studies have examined students' misconceptions about psychology in general, only 1 study has focused exclusively on misconceptions about mental illness, and that study examined only 5 such misconceptions. To overcome this gap in our knowledge and to devise effective teaching strategies to disabuse college students of false information, an up-to-date survey of current misconceptions and their correlates among students is necessary. In this study, 375 undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology courses completed an abnormal psychology misconceptions questionnaire, as well as measures assessing critical thinking, attitudes toward science, beliefs in paranormal phenomena, and vocational interests. Results revealed that certain misconceptions about mental illness and its treatment are widely held, and that compared with other students, students who endorse mental illness misconceptions tend to possess weaker critical thinking skills, are more inclined to accept paranormal claims, and are less likely to endorse scientific and behavioral views of psychology. Given the prevalence of abnormal psychology misconceptions among introductory students, we provisionally recommend assessing mental illness misconceptions early in an introductory course and utilizing empirically supported refutational methods to reduce student levels of mental illness misconceptions.

Objective The African Neuropsychology Battery (ANB) includes eight culturally appropriate cognitive tests developed for use in the Congo and other sub-Saharan African populations. The current study examines the reliability of the ANB in three samples of participants of African descent. Methods Subjects were recruited in the United States and the Congo to participate in three studies of ANB internal consistency reliability (Study 1), test–retest reliability (Study 2), and interrater reliability for the two ANB measures (i.e., Visuospatial Memory and Proverb Tests) requiring examiner ratings of response adequacy (Study 3). Subjects were administered ANB tests of visuospatial perception, language, memory, abstract reasoning, and problem solving. We calculated Cronbach’s alpha, corrected item-total correlations and mean inter-item correlations for internal consistency, Pearson product–moment correlations and intraclass correlation coefficients for test–retest reliability, and intraclass correlation coefficients for interrater reliability. Results The ANB tests had acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .37 to .93). Across subtests, test–retest reliability coefficients ranged from .39 to .91, and intraclass correlation stability coefficients (ICCs) ranged from .39 to .82. Of the two ANB tests requiring interrater reliability, only the Proverb Test had a low ICC of .13, (confidence intervals: −.29 to .52). Conclusion The present study demonstrated that most ANB tests show adequate reliability in participants of African descent. However, the scoring criteria of the African Proverb Test require revision in order to improve the interrater reliability of the measure.