We examine the moral hazard effects of bank recapitalizations by assessing the impact of the U.S. TARP program on market discipline exerted by subordinated debt-holders using a sample of 123 bank holding companies over the period 2004-2013. Predicted distress risk has a consistently positive and significant effect on sub-debt spreads, suggesting the presence of market discipline. A higher bailout probability significantly reduces the risk-sensitivity of spreads for the full sample, indicating a moral hazard effect of recapitalizations. This appears to be a too-big-to-fail effect, as it is absent when the largest banks are dropped from the sample. Results indicate that it is transitory. We also find a large effect of the crisis, appearing both as a uniform rise in, and a heightened risk sensitivity of, sub-debt spreads during the crisis.

A simple portfolio choice model shows that, when a bank's capital is constrained by regulation, regulatory cost (risk weightings) alters the risk and value calculations for the bank's assets. In particular, we find that banks may respond to stricter regulation by increasing the share of high‐risk assets. Our empirical results show that US banks responded to the implementation of the stricter Basel II regulations by increasing the share of high‐risk assets in the risky part of their portfolios.

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