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Which of the new political parties that emerged in advanced democracies faded away and which ones managed to survive and why? Considering a party as dead once it ceases to nominate candidates in any elections, we develop two sets of hypotheses to account for party death derived from two conceptions of political parties. One conceptualizes parties as vehicles formed by career-oriented politicians eager to maximize individual rewards. Failure to deliver seats or government access is therefore expected to predict an earlier death. The other conceptualizes parties as societal organizations that serve representational functions valued in themselves by elites and members alike. This conception stresses the importance of roots in society or ideological novelty. Using survival analysis, we test our hypotheses in 17 advanced democracies based on a new data set covering 144 new parties from birth until their (potential) death. Arguments derived from both conceptions have significant support stressing the complexity of the drivers underpinning parties’ very existence.

It is part of a civil servants job description to be responsive to its political leadership as well as to uphold legal norms. But what happens when the two types of demands conflict? When legal norms stipulate one thing, but political leaders want another. In modern de- mocracies, observing the rule of law is no less important than holding elections. Respect for legal norms by those who exercise government authority is widely regarded as the cornerstone of democracy and good governance. The question is what role the bureaucra- cy plays when it comes to defending legal norms vis-à-vis its political leaders. This article investigates this question theoretically as well as empirically. First by exploring the nor- mative and positive theoretical issues involved, and secondly by examining the institu- tional context and behavior of the civil service in the Danish state administration. The analysis draws on survey data where civil servants have been asked to respond to fictive scenarios that present a conflict between obedience to the minister and observing the law. A substantial share of the civil servants – up to 1⁄4 - choose to compromise legal obliga- tions to comply with Ministerial requests. The findings suggest that educational back- ground, position in the hierarchy, and work place and function matters. Lawyers, leaders, those who work in departments – as opposed to agencies – are thus less likely to show willingness to compromise their legal obligations than their colleagues are.

Bo Smith-udvalgets konklusioner om tilstanden i det danske embedsværk har sat markante aftryk i den offentlige debat. Konklusionerne indeholder en klar afvisning af, at der er systemiske fejl i samspillet mellem politikere og embedsmænd, og det fremhæves, at de klassiske embedsmandsnormer efterleves i betydelig udstrækning. Vi gennemgår her de undersøgelser, som konklusionerne hviler på, og afdækker væsentlige brud på forskningskriterierne og metodiske fejlgreb, som svækker validiteten af udvalgets konklusioner. Faktisk kunne dele af datagrundlaget lige så godt tolkes omvendt, når det handler om lovlighedsnormens overholdelse. Det fremgår nemlig, at et bemærkelsesværdigt højt antal embedsmænd er villige til at medvirke til ulovlige handlinger. Vi understreger derfor, at der er behov for flere og bedre undersøgelser for at få relevant viden om normoverholdelse i centraladministrationen.

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