The European Commission (EC) regulation draft of 2011 contains the external mandatory auditor rotation (audit firm rotation) as a reform measure to increase auditor independence. The external auditor firm rotation could supplement the internal mandatory rotation (auditor rotation) by the 8th EC directive. This article presents an agency theoretical foundation of rotation. In this context, the main influences on low balling and on the expectation gap will be presented. The total effect of the rotation on financial accounting and audit quality is theoretically uncertain, because the rotation can also lead to a decreased independence in a low balling situation and is connected with interrupted or lost learning and knowledge effects by the auditor or the audit firm. Then, a state of the art analysis of empirical research results with regard to auditor and audit firm rotation is focused. In contrast to the assumption of the EC, the majority of the empirical results don't lead to an increased financial accounting and audit quality by audit firm rotations. Furthermore, the positive effects of the internal rotation period of 7 years and the cooling off period of 2 years by the 8th EC directive are not empirically proved yet.

This article is focused on the assisting role and gatekeeper function of the external auditor in the German two tier system. From on an agency-theoretical view, the auditor is part of the in- and external corporate governance. Conflicts of interests may arise from different tasks of the assisting role and gatekeeper function of the auditor, influencing the quality of the in- and external audit. Thus, future research is needed to provide theoretical foundation of the auditor’s assisting role for the benefit of the shareholders

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The paper presents simultaneous models for accounting policy optimization of stock corporations according to German commercial law. In particular, we illustrate the integration into the optimization models of effective income tax, deferred taxes, remuneration principles for members of management boards and supervisory boards under stock corporation law, parameters for the distribution of profits, and key indicators of the annual financial statements. The models are useful to design optimal financial statements in line with the targets of the company