Although family-owned business succession has been widely researched, very few studies investigate the relationship between preperformance and succession. Drawing on the agency and the resource-based view theories, we investigate how previous firm performance may influence the nomination of a family or a nonfamily member to top senior positions. We argue that positive firm performance will lead to the nomination of a family member, while negative firm performance leads to nonfamily nominations. Using a stepwise logistic regression with a bootstrap procedure on a sample of nonfinancial firm listed in the Spanish Stock Exchange, the results indicate that performance prior to succession does not affect these nominations, while directive experience does.

In this paper we present empirical evidence on the relationship between board remuneration of a sample of large Spanish companies and a set of explanatory variables such as performance and size of the company. The objective is to provide additional empirical evidence based on the agency theory for the Spanish institutional context, which differs from most 'Anglo-Saxon' model studies. We focus on the impact of a company's governance structure on the relationship between pay and performance. Specifically, we consider ownership concentration and firm leverage as key determinants of the board -shareholders relationship. Our results confirm the positive relationship between board remuneration and company performance, which is stronger for book values than for stock market measures. Industry performance also explains the remuneration and provides useful information for evaluating board behaviour. Company size is also related to board remuneration and affects the payperformance relationship, although it is not relevant when we use an elasticity approach. Finally, the governance structure of companies is relevant when explaining the power of the compensation -performance relationship, and LABOUR 17 (1) 103-126 (2003) JEL G3, J33# 2003 CEIS, Fondazione

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