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Purpose This study aims to investigate the relationship between family managers and firms’ risk levels in a context characterized by low investor protection and firm opacity. Specifically, this paper examines whether the level of risk faced by firms is affected by family shareholders’ ownership stake and activism. Design/methodology/approach Corporate governance data were hand-collected for a sample of 90 Italian listed companies and 540 observations from the year 2018. Regression analysis was then used to test the research hypotheses. Findings This study provides evidence of a positive association between active family ownership and risk faced by sampled firms. This study also finds that the number of inside directors is negatively correlated with firms’ risk-taking. Overall, the results confirm family managers’ influence on firms’ risk choices and show consistency with theoretical arguments in favor of hiring professional managers to guide family-owned firms. Practical implications Practical implications emerge from the study findings. First, family owners should consider to hire a larger number of professional managers to support firms’ wealth maximization and retention and to reduce default risks. Second, investors should take into account the firms’ board of directors and management composition to better assess the investments risk level. Finally, the positive correlation between active family owners and systematic risk suggests the opportunity for regulators to improve the legal requirements related to minority directors to increase their effectiveness and, therefore, minority shareholders’ protection. Originality/value This study extends the literature on the association between ownership structure and firms’ risk levels, showing the effect of family managers on firms’ risk levels. Besides, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no previous study investigates professional executives’ influence on risk when family ownership prevails.

Purpose Building on behavioral agency theory, the authors explore the role played by corporate governance characteristics as drivers of the diversification strategies of family firms. Specifically, this study aims to investigate the effects of board size and board gender diversity on the likelihood that family firms will execute a diversifying acquisition vis-à-vis a related acquisition. Furthermore, the authors investigate the contingency effects played by foreign directorship and the firm’s listing status. Design/methodology/approach The hypotheses are tested on an original sample of 213 cross-border acquisitions executed by Italian family firms between 2008 and 2021. Findings The findings suggest that both large board sizes and greater gender diversity positively affect the diversification of family firms. While the presence of foreign directors magnifies the positive effect of board size, gender diversity discourages diversification in the case of listed firms. Originality/value The originality of this study is twofold. First, while prior literature has mostly focused on the family vs nonfamily dichotomy, this paper contributes to an emergent line of research investigating the heterogeneity among family firms’ corporate strategy decisions. Second, by exploring the corporate governance-diversification link in the context of family business, the authors answer to recent calls that diversification by family firms deserves further investigation in light of its highly controversial nature in terms of socioemotional wealth implications and potential mismatch among multiple objectives.

This study aims to explore the effect of family firms’ corporate governance characteristics on their acquisition propensity: as the extant literature is increasingly emphasizing the heterogeneity of family firms and is calling for further insights into the peculiarities affecting their decision-making processes, our objective lies in identifying corporate governance mechanisms that influence their acquisition attitude. Thus, building on the behavioural agency theory, we investigate the effect of family members’ ownership stake, their involvement in the board of directors (BoD), the family versus non-family chief executive officer (CEO), and the generational step on the propensity to execute acquisitions. We test our framework on a sample of 207 acquisitions executed by Italian listed family firms in the 2014–2020 period. In line with our prediction, we find evidence that family members sitting on the board of directors are negatively associated with acquisitions. However, when family firms are guided by a family versus a non-family CEO, the willingness to embark on acquisitions increases. Family ownership is a non-significant driver of the propensity to acquire, which further confirms the importance of decision-making bodies. Finally, the propensity to acquire does not appear to be driven by whether the firm is still in its first versus later generations. Overall, our study contributes to the ongoing conversations on the heterogeneity of family firms and offers several implications for both theory and practice.

The reporting of comprehensive income is becoming increasingly important. After the introduction of Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) reporting, as required by the 2007 IAS 1-revised, the IASB is currently seeking inputs from investors on the usefulness of unrealized gains and losses and on the role of comprehensive income. This circumstance is of particular relevance in code law countries, as local pre-IFRS accounting models influence financial statement preparers and users. This study aims at investigating the role played by unrealized gains and losses reporting on users' decision process, by examining the impact of OCI on the Italian listed companies RoE ratio and by surveying a sample of financial analysts, also content analysing their formal reports. The results show that the reporting of comprehensive income does not affect the financial statement users' decision process, although it statistically affects Italian listed entities' performance.