Women faculty in predominantly male departments at a large university were interviewed and responded to paper-and-pencil instruments in a test of Laws' analysis of the necessity for the "token women" adaptation to their marginality for success in academia. By multiple criteria, three clusters were identified: (a) token women, who accepted academia as a meritocracy, were aware of little sex discrimination and belonged to no feminist group; (b) nontoken women, who disagreed with academia as a meritocracy and were aware of sex discrimination; and (c) women with mixed or moderate orientations. (Membership in feminist groups was found in the latter two clusters.) Women in the three clusters did not differ significantly by academic rank or marital status and only marginally by age and longevity in academia. As predicted, however, they did differ by tenure status. Contrary to Laws' analysis, token women were not more likely to have had a sponsor, which was significantly related only to rank. Women in the three clusters were equally accurate in recognizing male-female status discrepancies. Their differing definitions of sex discrimination were revealed in differential bias when choosing among alternatives of indeterminate correctness. Token women minimized such discrepancies, in line with beliefs attributing them to women, rather than the system. Others maximized such discrepancies.The university faculty has traditionally been a man's world, except in those fast-disappearing enclaves considered "women's fields" (e.g., home economics). Today, faculty women are tallied on affirmative action reports i n columns for persons with "minority characteristics."The research reported here was initiated and conducted by the first author with contributlons at all stages bv the second author, under the third author's supervision The latter hdd no access to data on individual faculty women Kequests for reprints should be sent to Carolyn W

Three variables were hypothesized to cause a fear of crime and a potential change in behavior. These were: (1) crimes against a person rather than crimes against property; (2) a crime committed in an area frequented rather than a crime occurring in an area one never entered; (3) a recurring crime rather than a crime that occurred once. Two different samples of female subjects (n = 249) were approached at their residences and were asked to read one of a number of fictitious crime stories that the news media supposedly had not reported and to complete two scales measuring: (1) an emotional response to crime and (2) a potential behavioral response to crime. The results indicate that a physical assault produces both more fear and more potential behavioral change than a burglary. A crime that occurs eight times causes people to consider taking precautions in comparison to a crime that occurs once. There is some evidence that a crime in an area one frequents causes more fear than a crime occurring in an area one never enters.

This article makes an important distinction between two definitions of “token woman.” In the first definition, a token woman is one of few women in a predominantly male setting. The second meaning of “Token Woman” identifies that subset of such women who have made the distinctive psychological adaptation described by Laws (1975). The methodological decisions in Young, MacKenzie, and Sherif's (1980) research are justified as based on that definitional distinction. Constantinople's critique is shown to be appropriate as an alternative to Laws' theory, but not as a criticism of our research. Alternative generational explanations for previous findings about Token Women are not supported by existing data.

This article makes an important distinction between two definitions of “token woman.” In the first definition, a token woman is one of few women in a predominantly male setting. The second meaning of “Token Woman” identifies that subset of such women who have made the distinctive psychological adaptation described by Laws (1975). The methodological decisions in Young, MacKenzie, and Sherif's (1980) research are justified as based on that definitional distinction. Constantinople's critique is shown to be appropriate as an alternative to Laws' theory, but not as a criticism of our research. Alternative generational explanations for previous findings about Token Women are not supported by existing data.