imbalances are not unexpected given that the blood market operates without market imbalances are not unexpected given that the blood market operates without market prices and with limited storage length (about six weeks) for whole blood. Yet shifting prices and with limited storage length (about six weeks) for whole blood. Yet shifting to a system of paying blood donors seems a practical impossibility given attitudes to a system of paying blood donors seems a practical impossibility given attitudes toward paying blood donors and concerns that a paid system could compromise toward paying blood donors and concerns that a paid system could compromise blood safety. Nonetheless, we believe that an economic perspective offers promising blood safety. Nonetheless, we believe that an economic perspective offers promising directions to increase supply and improve the supply and demand balance even in directions to increase supply and improve the supply and demand balance even in the presence of volunteer supply and with the absence of market prices. the presence of volunteer supply and with the absence of market prices.

No abstract

This paper addresses volunteer labor markets where the lack of price signals, nonpecuniary motivations to supply labor, and limited fungibility of supply lead to market failure. To address the causes of the market failure, we conduct a field experiment with volunteer whole blood donors where we introduce a market-clearing mechanism (henceforth: the Registry). Our intention-to-treat estimates suggest that subjects invited to the Registry, regardless of joining, are 66% more responsive to critical shortage appeals than control subjects. While the Registry increases supply during a critical shortage episode, it does not increase supply when there is no shortage; thus, the Registry significantly improves coordination between volunteer donors and collection centers, thereby improving market outcomes. We find evidence that the Registry’s effectiveness stems from crowding-in volunteers with purely altruistic motives and volunteers with a preference for commitment. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.

No abstract

Market Design for Altruistic Supply: Evidence from the Lab * Volunteer supply is widespread, yet without a price inefficiencies occur due to suppliers' inability to coordinate with each other and with demand. For these contexts, we propose a market clearinghouse mechanism that improves efficiency if supply is altruistically provided. The mechanism, a registry, combines aggregate demand information with supplier's willingness to help, and invites volunteers to help only when excess demand occurs. We experimentally study three registries that include stochastic high-stakes demand and heterogeneous supplier costs. We find that all three registries improve efficiency dramatically; they eliminate unneeded costly help when demand is unexpectedly low and significantly increase supply (reduce shortages) otherwise. Further, two registries that invite exactly one registry member to help for each person needing help, rather than the third registry that continues asking members to help until someone helps, result in fewer people joining the registry, but those who join are more likely to help.