Research has produced inconclusive results concerning the effects of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on firm financial performance, with only 59 percent of studies demonstrating positive effects. Yet, still unaddressed is how CSR impacts the key driver of financial performance-firm growth. We develop new multidisciplinary theory integrating stakeholder and risk management theories with multi-period capital asset pricing. We test the direct and moderating effects of Social, Institutional, Strategic, and Technical CSR using a simultaneous equations model of endogenous CSR and Tobin's q ratio. Our 2004-12 sample of S&P 3000 firms show that all CSR dimensions directly bolster firm performance, while select dimensions moderate the relationship between firms' sales or asset growth and capitalized market value in the periods surrounding the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). These results deepen understanding of how different forms of CSR influence market value, and refine estimates of CSR's direct and moderating impacts on the growth-value relationship.

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This study examines the acquisition dynamics associated with the target management’s choice to initiate the sale of the firm using the auction method. Specifically, we examine opportunistic merger and acquisition (M&A) dynamics related to the target-initiated method-of-sale decision (auctions vs. one-on-one negotiations), as a noteworthy example of Akerlof’s (1970) theory of the market for lemons. While we find a strong positive relationship between proxies of adverse selection risk and the likelihood of target initiation, robustness tests suggest target initiation itself is a unique indicator of information asymmetry in an acquisition environment. We also find that most target-initiated transactions follow an auction as the method of sale, which increases target information asymmetry advantages. While wealth accrued to both bidders and targets increases in non-target-initiated auctions, this benefit disappears when the target initiates the acquisition, causing both bidders and targets to suffer wealth losses. According to Akerlof’s theory, these wealth losses represent the cost of perceived dishonesty due to enhanced adverse section risk, which provides noteworthy implications for both business and society.