Articles 27 and 34 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) recognise Indigenous Peoples’ laws. Art. 34 gives Indigenous Peoples the right to maintain their juridical systems or customs in accordance with international human rights standards. Although the UNDRIP is soft law, its core is arguably customary law and, therefore, a binding source of law. For States with Indigenous People, such as Norway, the UNDRIP is of paramount importance, from a legal, political, and not least moral perspective. This paper discusses norm hierarchies and tensions that are created in the meeting between the Indigenous customary law of the Sámi and statutory domestic Norwegian law. The introduction of customary, commonly unwritten, Indigenous rules into the judicial portfolio of a State creates an obvious challenge: what is their legal status? Can Indigenous law set aside domestic statutory norms? Some might argue that due to historical wrong, Indigenous law should always take precedence when domestic law conflicts with it. While Norwegian domestic law acknowledges the precedence of certain core human rights treaties over domestic laws, the same is not valid for Indigenous rights. How then should Indigenous custom be dealt with before a court of law, and how do the different legal systems relate to each other? This paper is foremost based on theoretical, to a lesser degree also on empirical material. It discusses on a general level the relationship between different legal systems within the same State and, on a specific level, the dealing of the Norwegian courts with Sámi Indigenous laws and customs.

Human trafficking in the form of labour exploitation appears to have gone under the legal radar domestically, regionally, and internationally, with ensuing grave consequences for the victims concerned. This paper critically discusses the current legal developments and interpretations of global and regional legal sources on forced labour and the challenges they face. A legal analysis is supplemented by information obtained through interviews with 14 presumed male victims of forced labour, who recently escaped a coercive work situation and were living in a safe house in Oslo (Norway). The paper will demonstrate the shortcomings of the law and its application, using the case of Norway and the affected men as an example. It examines the case law of the European Court of Human Rights using a vulnerability approach and argues that the inaction in preventing and prosecuting crimes committed towards people who are exploited for forced labour is a violation of their human rights and may be interpreted as granting impunity to their perpetrators. The situation for male victims of forced labour is particularly severe.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court contains the term ‘racial’ in its provisions on the crime of genocide, persecution and apartheid. However, it fails to provide for a definition of this historically burdened term. International criminal law is guided by the principle of legality and legal norms should be as narrowly defined as possible. This article will therefore attempt to provide a contemporary legal definition of ‘racial’. The article contains an overview of the historical development, the treatment of the issue of ‘race’ by anthropology and human rights, before turning to international criminal law. Cases dealt with by the ictr and the icty on ‘racial groups’ with regard to the crime of genocide will be analysed and categorised. The article concludes with a suggestion to juxtapose racial groups with ethnical groups, based on the perception of the perpetrator or the self-perception of the victims (subjective approach).

The crime against humanity of apartheid has been widely neglected: jurisprudence is non-existent and the academic discourse modest. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first international criminal tribunal to include the crime against humanity of apartheid in its statute, notwithstanding the controversy of this crime. According to critics the crime is a South African phenomenon that has not reached the status of customary law. The provision on apartheid in the Rome Statute of the ICC builds on the Apartheid Convention, which is highly contentious and not signed by any Western state. All the more, it is surprising that apartheid was included in the Statute.Despite the fact that the crime of apartheid has never been prosecuted, this article argues that its inclusion into the Rome Statute raises some unique and interesting questions . It shows the international community's belief in the deterrent effect of this crime, as well as its continued importance. This article will scrutinise the elements of the crime and reveal definitional challenges. It will, in particular, discuss potential contemporary situations of apartheid. The ICC Prosecutor will have to release apartheid from its historical connection in order to bring to justice perpetrators of systematic racial oppression.

Abstract.The provisions on genocide protect four exclusive, amongst others the racial, groups. Yet, international criminal tribunals are manifestly uncomfortable with collective groupings and interpret 'race' rather inconsistently. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to a subjective approach based upon the perpetrator's perception of the targeted group. The victim's membership is accordingly not determined objectively, but by the perception of differentness. This article incorporates the theory of imagined identities into law, thereby providing tribunals with a tool to define 'race' . Its essence is that even if the group does not exist, it must be granted protection because of its perceived and thereby socially relevant differentness. This partially socio-anthropological approach will have to be brought into conformity with the principle of strict legality. It will be demonstrated that the theory of imagined identities has been applied in case law, thereby enhancing not only its theoretical, but also its practical relevance. Keywords