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This article presents the impact of displaying accurate or inaccurate position estimates on air mission commanders’ (AMC) situation awareness (SA) during datalink interruptions between AMC and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The lack of current information about UAV state and position during datalink interruptions is suspected to negatively influence the controlling AMC's SA. We assume that the AMC's SA can be supported by displaying a state estimate, based on last transmitted data, instead of displaying last known position. An experimental evaluation in a full‐mission research cockpit simulator showed improvements in subjective SA with estimate shown. Objective SA only improved, if the estimate was accurate. Although we expected a negative impact of inaccurate estimates on objective SA (since the user might falsely trust it), none could be observed. Improvements in SA with accurate estimates, but no observable degradations with inaccurate estimates suggest benefits of showing an estimate in any case.

Many sources maintain that the role played by air power in the 1973 Yom Kippur War was important. Other interpretations state that control of air space over the battlefield areas, (either by aircraft or anti-aircraft defences), was vital. Yet another standpoint is that newer, sophisticated equipment obtained by the Israelis towards the end of the war caused the outcome of the conflict to change decisively in their favour. Observers have also mentioned that the Arab preoccupation with the control of the air by means of a 'missile umbrella' greatly influenced their ground operations. Analogous arguments concerning the role of the tank, versus anti-tank devices, have been described in previous Pointers. It would appear that the Yom Kippur War has resulted in new interpretations of 'old lessons, rather than radically new lessons. Even a subject as modern as Electronic Counter Measures will be seen to be very similar in basic aim to those practised by British Bomber Command during the last War. The technology and design philosophy to implement these aims has, however, changed radically. A comparison of the Yom Kippur War with earlie: historical events may cause Henry Ford's contentious statement to spring to mind: 'History is bunk'. But then, to analyse the Yom Kippur War in isolation would 8:30 be 'bunk'. 10 obtain a thorough evaluation of the subject, it has been deemed necessary to approach it from the viewpoint of comparative history. Thus, the first article on 'Aircraft and Missiles deals with selected aspects of the developments of air power as from the First World War. Strategic bombing is not discussed, for the Yom Kippur War-saw aircraft used mostly in a tactical role. For several reasons, dependence upon strategic bombing had been ruled out by the Israeli Air Force. 2 A more specific analysis of the use of aircraft and missiles in the Yom Kippur War per se, with emphasis on the technical aspects will be given in the next article.

This Article, the last of four concerning the role of air power in the Yom Kippur War, analysis the following:

1. Missile effectiveness - (surface-to-air missiles, air-to-surface missiles, surface-to-surface missiles).
2. Aerial combat and pilot training.
3. Electronic warfare, Precision Guided Munitions and Remotely Piloted Vehicles.
4. The use of satellites for real time intelligence.

No abstract