No abstract

In the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), Chile defeated Peru and Bolivia, and acquired territories that contained vast deposits of sodium nitrate, a leading fertilizer. Chile's export tax on nitrates later accounted for at least one half of all government revenue. We employ a multi-country model of export taxation in order to simulate the potential government revenues that Bolivia, Chile and Peru could have earned under the counterfactual scenario that Chile did not conquer the nitraterich provinces of its adversaries. Our results are that Peruvian and Bolivian government revenues could have been at least double their historical levels. We estimate that, over the remainder of the nineteenth century, Chile's earnings from nitrates would have fallen by 80%.Keywords Export tax Á Nitrates Á War of the Pacific Á South America JEL Classification C72 Á F13 Á F14 Á F17 Á H21 Á N46 Á N76

As a result of the War of the Pacific (1879–1883), Chile conquered Peruvian and Bolivian territories rich in nitrates and guano. We conduct econometric tests for structural breaks in the time series of the government bonds for Chile and Peru between 1876 and 1890 in order to examine the effects of the changes in resource endowments on the investors’ perceptions of the risk premia of Chilean and Peruvian securities. Our results reveal that investors were extremely pessimistic about the prospects of Chilean, and especially Peruvian debt prior to the war. Early Chilean victories that anticipated the transfer of the richly endowed provinces to Chile caused significant increases in the price of Chilean securities. But such was the low regard with which investors viewed the Peruvian government that the fall of Lima caused an increase in the price of Peruvian bonds on the hope that Chile would assume some of the responsibility for them. Endowments, reputations, and the countries’ financial conditions figure prominently as the driving forces behind the investors’ behavior.Sovereign debt, Natural resources, Nitrates, War of the Pacific

Upon gaining independence, most Spanish American countries had accumulated a substantial external debt, and by 1829 each defaulted. It took decades for these countries to settle their debts and even longer for them to access new loans. We argue that a major factor influencing the pattern of debt service was the incidence of war. War created incentives for governments to channel scarce resources to «emergency» spending and domestic debt service, rather than to the repayment of the foreign debt. Interestingly, we detect an asymmetry between countries long in good standing with creditors and those that had only recently settled. Countries that had established a longer record of continuous debt service were far less likely to default in times of war. We also find that international wars were responsible for the largest effects.

During the second half of the eighteenth century the Spanish Crown monopolised the tobacco industry in its American colonies, creating vertically integrated organisations which included factories for the production of cigars and cigarettes. A detailed analysis of the regulations, organisation and policies applied during the Peruvian viceroyalty suggests that Bourbon officials were effective managers. The monopoly was successful at curbing contraband and extracting rents. The evolution of monopoly policies, however, reflected political constraints on the Crown's efforts to raise revenues. The archival evidence suggests that Bourbon officials closed the tobacco factories in Peru in 1791 as a result of public opposition.