Current literature holds that many cognitive functions can be performed outside consciousness. Evidence for this view comes from unconscious priming. In a typical experiment, visual stimuli are masked such that participants are close to chance performance when directly asked to which of two categories the stimuli belong. This close-to-zero sensitivity is seen as evidence that participants cannot consciously report the category of the masked stimuli. Nevertheless, the category of the masked stimuli can indirectly affect responses to other stimuli (e.g., reaction times or brain activity)—an effect called priming. The priming effect is seen as evidence for a higher sensitivity to the masked stimuli in the indirect responses as compared with the direct responses. Such an apparent difference in sensitivities is taken as evidence that processing occurred unconsciously. But we show that this “standard reasoning of unconscious priming” is flawed: Sensitivities are not properly compared, creating the wrong impression of a difference in sensitivities even if there is none. We describe the appropriate way to determine sensitivities, replicate the behavioral part of a landmark study, develop methods to estimate sensitivities from reported summary statistics of published studies, and use these methods to reanalyze 15 highly influential studies. Results show that the interpretations of many studies need to be changed and that a community effort is required to reassess the vast literature on unconscious priming. This process will allow scientists to learn more about the true boundary conditions of unconscious priming, thereby advancing the scientific understanding of consciousness.

In recent years, several functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies showed that correct stimulus predictions reduce the neural responses when compared to surprising events (Egner et al., 2010). Further, it has been shown that such fulfilled expectations enhance the magnitude of repetition suppression (RS, i.e. a decreased neuronal response after the repetition of a given stimulus) in face selective visual cortex as well (Summerfield et al., 2008).

A long tradition of electrophysiological studies, using oddball sequences, showed that the neural responses to a given stimulus differ when their presentation occurs frequently (standards) as compared to rare, infrequent presentations (deviants). This difference, originally described in acoustic perception, can also be detected in the visual modality and is termed as visual mismatch negativity (vMMN). Also, a large number of studies detected the reduction of the neuronal response after the repetition of a given stimulus (repetition suppression - RS) and it was suggested that RS is the major mechanism of MMN, an explanation currently also supported by animal studies. However, human studies have proposed that a surprise-related response enhancement for the deviant stimuli might also underlie vMMN. Therefore, the aim of the current study was to disentangle which neural mechanism explains vMMN better: the surprise related response enhancement for the presentation of rare deviants or the RS related to the frequent presentation of the standards. Since the MMN depends strongly on the applied categories, we tested the neural mechanisms of vMMN for different stimulus categories (faces, chairs, real and false characters) using a visual oddball paradigm. We found significant vMMN for every stimulus category. Interestingly, the neural mechanisms behind vMMN were found to be category dependent (assuming no cross-adaptation effects): for faces and chairs it was largely driven by RS, whereas for real and false characters it was mainly due to surprise-related changes.

In priming research, it is often argued that humans can discriminate stimuli outside consciousness. For example, the semantic meaning of numbers can be processed even when the numbers are so strongly masked that participants are not aware of them. These claims are typically based on a certain pattern of results: Direct measures indicate no conscious awareness of the masked stimuli, while indirect measures show clear priming effects of the same stimuli on reaction times or neurophysiological measures. From this pattern, preserved (unconscious) processing in the indirect task is concluded. However, this widely used standard reasoning is problematic and leads to spurious claims of unconscious processing. Such problems can be avoided by comparing sensitivities of direct and indirect measures. Many studies are affected by these problems, such that a reassessment of the literature is needed. Here, we investigated whether numbers can be processed unconsciously. In three experiments, we replicated and extended well-established effects of number priming over a wide range of stimulus visibilities. We then compared the standard reasoning to a sensitivity analysis, where direct and indirect effects are compared using the same metric. Results show that the sensitivities of indirect measures did not exceed those of direct measures, thereby indicating no evidence for preserved unconscious processing when awareness of the stimuli is low. Instead, it seems that at low visibility there is residual processing that affects direct and indirect measures to a similar degree. This suggests that similar processing modes cause those effects in direct and indirect measures.

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