Currently, little is known about the viral kinetics of influenza A during infection within an individual. We utilize a series of mathematical models of increasing complexity, which incorporate target cell limitation and the innate interferon response, to examine influenza A virus kinetics in the upper respiratory tracts of experimentally infected adults. The models were fit to data from an experimental H1N1 influenza A/Hong Kong/123/77 infection and suggest that it is important to include the eclipse phase of the viral life cycle in viral dynamic models. Doing so, we estimate that after a delay of ϳ6 h, infected cells begin producing influenza virus and continue to do so for ϳ5 h. The average lifetime of infected cells is ϳ11 h, and the half-life of free infectious virus is ϳ3 h. We calculated the basic reproductive number, R 0 , which indicated that a single infected cell could produce ϳ22 new productive infections. This suggests that antiviral treatments have a large hurdle to overcome in moderating symptoms and limiting infectiousness and that treatment has to be initiated as early as possible. For about 50% of patients, the curve of viral titer versus time has two peaks. This bimodal behavior can be explained by incorporating the antiviral effects of interferon into the model. Our model also compared well to an additional data set on viral titer after experimental infection and treatment with the neuraminidase inhibitor zanamivir, which suggests that such models may prove useful in estimating the efficacies of different antiviral therapies for influenza A infection.

Recent human deaths due to infection by highly pathogenic (H5N1) avian influenza A virus have raised the specter of a devastating pandemic like that of 1917-1918, should this avian virus evolve to become readily transmissible among humans. We introduce and use a large-scale stochastic simulation model to investigate the spread of a pandemic strain of influenza virus through the U.S. population of 281 million individuals for R 0 (the basic reproductive number) from 1.6 to 2.4. We model the impact that a variety of levels and combinations of influenza antiviral agents, vaccines, and modified social mobility (including school closure and travel restrictions) have on the timing and magnitude of this spread. Our simulations demonstrate that, in a highly mobile population, restricting travel after an outbreak is detected is likely to delay slightly the time course of the outbreak without impacting the eventual number ill. For R 0 < 1.9, our model suggests that the rapid production and distribution of vaccines, even if poorly matched to circulating strains, could significantly slow disease spread and limit the number ill to <10% of the population, particularly if children are preferentially vaccinated. Alternatively, the aggressive deployment of several million courses of influenza antiviral agents in a targeted prophylaxis strategy may contain a nascent outbreak with low R 0, provided adequate contact tracing and distribution capacities exist. For higher R0, we predict that multiple strategies in combination (involving both social and medical interventions) will be required to achieve similar limits on illness rates. antiviral agents ͉ infectious diseases ͉ simulation modeling ͉ social network dynamics ͉ vaccines I t is inevitable that another influenza pandemic will occur, and recent events suggest that this might happen sooner rather than later (1). A highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza A virus appears to have become endemic in avian hosts in Asia, and it is now spreading in migratory birds westward across eastern Europe. Human infections caused by this virus have a high case fatality rate; together with recent genetic data that implicate direct transmission of avianadapted influenza virus to humans as the cause of the 1918 influenza pandemic (2), these conditions raise the specter of another devastating pandemic. To date, H5N1 viruses cannot transmit readily from human to human, thus providing a window to plan for the pandemic that will occur should the virus evolve to be readily transmissible among humans. If the nascent pandemic is not contained by timely intervention at its source (3, 4), international travel could carry pandemic viruses around the globe within weeks to months of the initiation of the outbreak, causing a worldwide public health emergency.Intensive resources to minimize the impact of the outbreak? Precise planning is hampered by several unknowns, most critically the eventual human-to-human transmissibility of the humanadapted avian strain (characterized by the basic reproductive number R 0 , the ave...

Planning a response to an outbreak of a pandemic strain of influenza is a high public health priority. Three research groups using different individual-based, stochastic simulation models have examined the consequences of intervention strategies chosen in consultation with U.S. public health workers. The first goal is to simulate the effectiveness of a set of potentially feasible intervention strategies. Combinations called targeted layered containment (TLC) of influenza antiviral treatment and prophylaxis and nonpharmaceutical interventions of quarantine, isolation, school closure, community social distancing, and workplace social distancing are considered. The second goal is to examine the robustness of the results to model assumptions. The comparisons focus on a pandemic outbreak in a population similar to that of Chicago, with Ϸ8.6 million people. The simulations suggest that at the expected transmissibility of a pandemic strain, timely implementation of a combination of targeted household antiviral prophylaxis, and social distancing measures could substantially lower the illness attack rate before a highly efficacious vaccine could become available. Timely initiation of measures and school closure play important roles. Because of the current lack of data on which to base such models, further field research is recommended to learn more about the sources of transmission and the effectiveness of social distancing measures in reducing influenza transmission.influenza antiviral agents ͉ mitigation ͉ prophylaxis ͉ social distancing ͉ transmission

Despite treatment with potent antiretroviral drugs and the suppression of plasma HIV-1 RNA to undetectable levels for 20 months or more, HIV-1 transcription persists in peripheral-blood mononuclear cells. Unless the quasi-steady state levels of HIV DNA and mRNA eventually disappear with longer periods of therapy, these findings suggest that HIV-1 infection cannot be eradicated with current treatments.

Replication-competent HIV-1 can be isolated from infected patients despite prolonged plasma virus suppression by anti-retroviral treatment. Recent studies have identified resting, memory CD4+ T lymphocytes as a long-lived latent reservoir of HIV-1 (refs. 4,5). Cross-sectional analyses indicate that the reservoir is rather small, between 103 and 107 cells per patient. In individuals whose plasma viremia levels are well suppressed by anti-retroviral therapy, peripheral blood mononuclear cells containing replication-competent HIV-1 were found to decay with a mean half-life of approximately 6 months, close to the decay characteristics of memory lymphocytes in humans and monkeys. In contrast, little decay was found in a less-selective patient population. We undertook this study to address this apparent discrepancy. Using a quantitative micro-culture assay, we demonstrate here that the latent reservoir decays with a mean half-life of 6.3 months in patients who consistently maintain plasma HIV-1 RNA levels of fewer than 50 copies/ml. Slower decay rates occur in individuals who experience intermittent episodes of plasma viremia. Our findings indicate that the persistence of the latent reservoir of HIV-1 despite prolonged treatment is due not only to its slow intrinsic decay characteristics but also to the inability of current drug regimens to completely block HIV-1 replication.