Many animals find extreme versions of secondary sexual characteristics attractive, and such preferences can enhance reproductive success (Andersson, 1994). We hypothesized, therefore, that extreme versions of sex-typical traits may be attractive in human faces. We created supermale and superfemale faces by exaggerating all spatial differences between an average male and an average female face. In Expt 1 the male average was preferred to a supermale (50% exaggeration of differences from the female average). There was no clear preference for the female average or the superfemale (50% exaggeration). In Expt 2, participants chose the most attractive face from sets of images containing feminized as well as masculinized images for each sex, and spanning a wider range of exaggeration levels than in Expt 1. Chinese sets were also shown, to see whether similar preferences would occur for a less familiar race (participants were Caucasian). The most attractive female image was significantly feminized for faces of both races. However, the most attractive male image for both races was also significantly feminized. These results indicate that feminization, rather than sex exaggeration per se, is attractive in human faces, and they corroborate similar findings by Perrett et al. (1998).

It has recently been suggested that the cognitions of unrestrained eaters and those of individuals with eating disorders are at opposing ends of a continuum, with restrained eaters occupying an intermediate position. The present study explored the everyday cognitions of 10 restrained and 10 unrestrained eaters under fasting and nonfasting conditions using a random thought-sampling technique. Analysis of the thought transcripts yielded a number of categories related to food, self, and others. The results revealed no differences between restrained and unrestrained eaters in terms of their relative percentages of thoughts about food and self. Differences were evident, however, in the nature of their cognitions. The results from this study suggest that the continuum hypothesis may hold only when it is the nature of cognitions, not their frequency, that is considered.