The EU increasingly uses non-binding agreements as part of its response to the ongoing migration crisis. The preparation and implementation of such agreements are conducted in imprecise circumstances in terms of institutional responsibilities and they are subject to limited, if any, parliamentary control and judicial review. Taking the topical Afghanistan–EU Joint Way Forward as a focus point, this article raises the question whether the increasing recourse to non-binding instruments may be interpreted as a way of circumventing the constitutional allocation of powers to and within the EU. It highlights substantial issues related to the protection of fundamental rights and the allocation of the EU's financial resources stemming from the Joint Way Forward. It shows a number of legal drawbacks to this trend of using such non-binding instruments and argues in favour of more transparency and procedural clarity in their negotiation and implementation.

Instead of approaching rights by categorising them into various substantive types or distinguishing them from other concepts, such as principles, this book suggests that individual rights are better understood through a relational definition. An individual right under EU law can thus be defined as the correlative of an obligation, triggered into existence by an individual’s interest in the fulfilment of this obligation. Scanning CJEU case law over successive generations of rights, the book demonstrates that this definition of individual rights resists the test of time and the successive reconfigurations of the EU’s legal order. Catherine Warin, a practising lawyer at the Luxembourg bar, holds a PhD in law from the University of Luxembourg. This book is based on her PhD thesis, for which she was awarded the Pierre Pescatore Prize by the University of Luxembourg’s Doctoral School of Law.

Defrenne claimed rights under Article 119 EEC to challenge terms of her contract with the airline SABENA obliging her to retire at the age of 40 whilst her male colleagues were allowed to work until the age of 55 allowing them to reach higher levels of salaries and retirement pensions.

The courts of the EU's Member States have a duty to ensure the effective protection of individuals who are confronted with administrative decisions potentially infringing their rights. However, the principle of mutual trust is often understood as a limit to this protection. This is in so far as it requires domestic courts to abstain from reviewing decisions made by administrations of other Member States, even though such decisions may have effects beyond national boundaries. As transnational administrative procedures become increasingly frequent, this article analyses the implications of the principles of effective judicial protection and of mutual trust on the review of such procedures by domestic courts. It shows how, by gradually allowing domestic courts to review certain types of manifest errors committed beyond their national jurisdiction, the CJEU is moving past the apparent opposition of these principles. It finally argues that developing the transnational judicial review of manifest error may help improve the effective judicial protection of individuals.

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