For those who spoke on behalf of Leave voters, the result on 23 June 2016 meant the people of the United Kingdom were taking back ‘control’ or getting their ‘own country back’. However, two parts of the United Kingdom did not vote Leave: Scotland and Northern Ireland. Here, the significant counterpoint to ‘taking back control is “waking up in a different country”’, and this sentiment has unique political gravity. Its unique gravity involves two distinct but intimately related matters. The first concerns the politics of identity. The vote was mainly, if not entirely, along nationalist/unionist lines, confirming an old division: unionists were staking a ‘British’ identity by voting Leave, and nationalists an Irish one by voting Remain. The second concerns borders. The Good Friday/Belfast Agreement of 1998 meant taking the border out of Irish politics. Brexit means running the border between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom across the island as a sovereign ‘frontier’. Although this second matter is discussed mainly in terms of the implications for free movement of people and goods, we argue that it is freighted with meanings of identity. Brexit involves a ‘border in the mind’, those shifts in self-understanding, individually and collectively, attendant upon the referendum. This article examines this ‘border in the mind’ according to its effects on identity, politics and the constitution, and their implications for political stability in Northern Ireland.

No abstract

The UK’s decision to leave the European Union in 2016 threatens to open up a range of territorial management issues that have long remained unexplored. Since 1999, the UK’s devolution settlements have allowed divergent constitutional narratives to develop and to co-exist. This ‘constructive ambiguity’ has led UK territorial governance to take the form of ‘Schrodinger’s devolution’, where Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have and have not experienced fundamental constitutional change. However, the technical requirements of Brexit will mandate the need for exact decisions where ‘constructive ambiguity’ has existed up to now. The UK’s unwritten constitution, limited intergovernmental relations and a lack of shared rule mechanisms mean that these technical decisions have the potential to lead to ongoing political instability.

No abstract

No abstract